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Tempered Power, Variegated Capitalism, 
Law and Society 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE† 
I. TEMPERING POWER AT BALDY 
The Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy has a richly 
variegated intellectual history to celebrate for its fortieth 
anniversary. Indeed, the law school that houses Baldy was a 
mother-ship of the law and society movement. In his history 
of the Baldy Center, Luke Hammill notes that Lynn Mather, 
soon to be a Baldy Director, spoke of the germinal 1975 Law 
and Society Association conference in the following terms: 
According to that conference program, there were exactly 100 
participants. . . . There were also well-known names such as Lon 
Fuller, E. Adamson Hoebel and Alan Dershowitz. The group was 
small enough that Red Schwartz, then dean of the law school, was 
able to invite them all to his Buffalo home for the concluding 
reception.1 
This Article focuses more specifically on the Baldy role, 
from its inception, as a founder of the socio-legal tradition of 
regulatory studies; that is, the study of steering 
concentrations of power. The diversity of Baldy 
 
† Australian National University. My thanks to Philip Pettit for comments on 
aspects of the paper and to the participants at Buffalo and to Jacinta Mulders for 
research assistance. 
 1. LUKE HAMMILL, 40 YEARS AT THE BALDY CENTER: A LAW AND SOCIETY HUB 
IN BUFFALO 5 (2018). 
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interdisciplinary scholarship offers a galaxy of gems of 
variegated insight for my project as set out here. This 
includes knowledge from critical legal studies, private 
enforcement of environmental laws, relational rights 
enforcement, Buddhist law and compassion, and on 
regulatory communities and regulatory cultures. Then there 
is the more encompassing Baldy contribution of 
strengthening our capacity to focus both the “regulatory 
lens” and the “law and society lens.” Valuable lenses they 
have proved to be in the hands of so many Baldy scholars 
across these past forty years. 
In this Article, I use the insights from the fields of 
knowledge collected at Baldy to consider how to temper 
power, and how to transform bad power in a society through 
good power. This is a non-linear art, which is partly a sort of 
ju-jitsu of using power against itself. In contemporary 
conditions, where power has shifted so greatly from states to 
capital, it is necessarily an art of responsiveness to 
variegations of capitalism, and major societal crises can be 
transformational tipping points. I will illustrate these ideas 
through the specific challenges of tempering the power of 
finance and accomplishing conditions of fair work. It is 
argued that unless these challenges of tempering power are 
met, globally liberal capitalism will continue to lose influence 
not to the communism it long feared, but to authoritarian 
capitalism engendered by a tempering of communism with 
capitalism. This Article argues that inadequate regulation of 
finance, unfair labor practices, and crumbling environmental 
governance pose existential threats to liberal capitalism. 
A. Baldy Insights 
As a starting point, Baldy’s work on Law, Buddhism, 
and Social Change led by former Director Rebecca French 
may seem esoteric, though not for those who hail from 
Buddhist societies, and not for the subject of this essay. 
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When the Dalai Lama spoke at Baldy in 2006,2 his theme 
was compassion in the implementation of law, and 
responsive attention to context in law’s implementation. I 
read that contribution as one about compassion and context 
in the tempering of power, a craft the Dalai Lama lovingly 
masters. The Dalai Lama pursues relational justice and 
relational social justice in his advocacy of nonviolent 
resistance to tyranny. He lives this as he works for freedom 
for his beloved Tibet. His insights have applications beyond 
the field of his immediate influence, and will be used later in 
this essay to show how relational justice and compassionate 
tempering of power can be used in struggles to regulate 
variegated capitalism. 
From the work of the Baldy Center we also learn that 
while commerce and law are often brutal, law can be 
compassionate when it embraces gifts of compassion through 
pro bono values.3 American divorce law evinces both vicious 
excess as well as the compassion, beauty, and relational 
justice of the collaborative family law movement—so 
admired and indeed emulated by two law firms in my little 
Australian city.4 In Australia, we are grateful for the 
collaborative quality of the socio-legal research community 
on divorce that has enjoyed so much fellowship and 
leadership from Buffalo. My personal favorite from Baldy on 
how relational law can temper power is David Engel and 
Frank Munger on disability rights,5 showing that in 
America, reputationally the homeland of adversarial legal 
 
 2. See generally Rebecca R. French, Law, Buddhism, and Social Change: A 
Conversation with the 14th Dalai Lama, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 635 (2007). 
 3. See PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF 
PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 
2009). 
 4. See LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF 
PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE (2001); JULIE TAYLOR & JUNE THOBURN, 
COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE WITH VULNERABLE CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 
(2017). 
 5. DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND 
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003). 
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formalism, disability rights law has transformed the lives of 
disabled people for the better. Yet in Engel and Munger’s 
empirical sample, no disabled person ever resorted to 
litigation to enforce their new rights. Rather, what happened 
was that the college student in a wheelchair would pitch an 
appeal for relational justice to her Dean. She would appeal 
to the Dean’s compassion as she invoked informally her new 
legal right to a ramp to access a building. America’s ramp 
arrived; new rights were vindicated across your country 
through relational power and compassionate strength. Social 
justice was transformed through many such decisive 
moments of assertion. 
This Article argues a counterintuitive case for 
compassionate and relational justice in regulating the 
excesses of Wall Street. Yet my argument is premised on the 
belief that this can only succeed if two conditions are met: 
first, if such justice is responsive to new variegations of 
capitalism; and second, if a “Sword of Damocles” stands 
behind relational and compassionate justice to take decisive 
action in the courts at the moment of exception.6 In this 
context, the state of exception stands in exactly the opposite 
place to where it is put by Carl Schmitt7 and Giorgio 
Agamben:8 for them, the state of exception is where tyranny 
takes over from rule of law. The Dalai Lama’s state of 
exception arises instead where pursuit of compassionate 
justice is overtaken by formal law enforcement (for example, 
in the case of responsibility to protect being activated in 
international law when compassionate appeals are 
bludgeoned by untempered power). In a similar way, 
 
 6. This Sword of Damocles part of the argument is thinly theorized in this 
Article. I acknowledge the influence of the work of Lawrence Sherman and many 
others in another essay on when and how relational justice should be supplanted 
by deterrent or incapacitative justice as a last resort in John Braithwaite, 
Minimally Sufficient Deterrence, 47 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES. 69 (2018). 
 7. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 2005) (1922). 
 8. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of 
Chi. Press ed. 2005). 
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unbridled corporate power can be bound through a relational 
justice of internationally networked justice, and without 
bringing in the troops. By putting Wall Street in harness 
with the “99 percent,” by binding business back together with 
the people through justice, capitalism can be more 
sustainable and make more money more sustainably in the 
long run. We can appeal to Wall Street in strategic 
regulatory conversations9 by appealing to their 
compassionate interest in leaving the society better for their 
grandchildren.10 The alternative we can put to them is that 
more, or even worse events than those that occurred in 2008, 
will one day leave their society and their banks in ruins. 
II. TEMPERED POWER11 
Martin Krygier has elaborated some persuasive 
arguments about abuse of power that render ideals such as 
limiting, curbing, or controlling power less appealing than 
“tempering” power.12 Power is a good thing; it is needed to 
enforce legal judgements, to keep the peace, to raise funds to 
build schools and hospitals. It is untempered power that is 
bad because it is arbitrary power. Arbitrary power in turn is 
conceived as unchecked power. Power can be checked in 
many ways—by balances of power, such as two houses in a 
legislature, or federalism—but accountability is the most 
 
 9. See Julia Black, Regulatory Conversations, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 163 (2002). 
 10. Braithwaite and Drahos have argued that webs of dialogue can do most 
of the work of global business regulation, but that webs of controls that include 
formal enforcement of state and international law are also important at many 
moments of exception at the peaks of private, public, and civil society 
enforcement pyramids. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL 
BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY 
CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER (2008). 
 11. In this analysis I not only draw heavily on Martin Krygier and Baldy 
Center thinking. I have also drawn on previous publications, particularly some I 
have co-authored with Hilary Charlesworth, Adérito Soares, and Philip Pettit. 
These previous works are cited in the sections of text where they are discussed. 
 12. Martin Krygier, Tempering Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 34, 35 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017). 
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important way of checking power. Accountability to the rule 
of law is the most important form of accountability. But there 
are many other forms of accountability beyond the rule of 
law.13 The classic conception of accountability involves being 
required to give an account to which people can listen and 
respond, as in producing minutes of a meeting after all 
opinions are heard at the meeting, financial “accounts” are 
tabled, and hard questions are asked of officeholders.14 
Accountability in family life for children who hit their 
siblings involves requiring them to reflect on how their 
sibling would have felt, on whether what they did was right, 
and some kind of rectification such as an apology. 
Power that is tempered by the rule of law’s discipline is 
more resilient in important ways. It grows authority in the 
art of regulation and governance; authority can be 
distinguished from domination (which is untempered, 
arbitrary power). Freedom as non-domination is the 
conception of freedom valorized in Philip Pettit’s republican 
theory of freedom, which will be discussed further in the next 
section.15 The republican regulatory theory interpretation of 
the tempering of power is that power should be regulated to 
maximize freedom. The essence of being unfree according to 
this republican conception is the condition of being a slave. 
To be a slave is to be subject to the arbitrary power of 
another. The slave-owner is not required to listen to the slave 
nor to give any account to the slave, or anyone much else. 
The slave is the property of a slave-owner, who can do 
whatever he wishes with his private property without being 
constrained by laws that apply to persons. The capricious 
 
 13. I am grateful to the conversation at the 2018 “Tempering Power” 
symposium and for discussions afterwards with Martin Krygier and Philip Pettit, 
which went to the rejection of lists of attributes for what is involved in tempering 
power in favor of an accountability emphasis combined with recognition that 
accountability takes many forms beyond classic lists of rule of law virtues. 
 14. See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITIES IN 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES (2003). 
 15. See Philip Pettit on freedom as non-domination as a republican virtue. 
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM (1997). 
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power of domination struggles to build long-run legitimacy 
and the trust so vital to contemporary economies, which 
cannot flourish as slave societies. What worked well enough 
for the economics of machine bureaucracies that built 
pyramids or operated plantations cannot work for an 
innovative information economy. 
For Krygier, and for ancient Greek philosophers who 
advanced temperance as a virtue, temperance means a 
“moderating balance of elements” (for example, justice 
balanced with compassion).16 Tempered steel is made 
tougher, less hard, and less brittle as an alloy (a balance of 
more resilient metals) in a test of extreme heat. For Krygier, 
this tempering metaphor in governance means tempered 
power is less brutal and less brittle, and “infrastructural” 
rather than “despotic,”17 because arbitrary power in pursuit 
of its whims is constrained by rule of law and other 
accountability institutions in a way that untempered power 
is not, and so power is less available for the arbitrary pursuit 
of power-holders’ whims. Accountability institutions that 
temper power grow deeper roots of authority for the 
enactment of power. This is what enables power to become 
more infrastructural in a way that penetrates a society. The 
institutional infrastructure of tempered power makes it more 
enduring as a rule of law virtue compared to an arbitrary 
“rule of men.”18 In his essay in this volume, Krygier asks why 
 
 16. Krygier, supra note 12, at 47. 
 17. Michael Mann, Infrastuctural Power Revisited, 43 STUD. INT’L COMP. DEV. 
355, 355 (2008). 
 18. Likewise, when in common usage we temper justice with mercy, we 
strengthen justice. Soldiers that are tempered by combat are hardened, but also 
moderated through the wisdom and prudence of experience. When music is 
tempered it becomes more powerful in the sense of more beautiful because it can 
be modulated into other keys. Tempering a sauce in cooking means gently 
heating egg yolk or a dairy ingredient before adding it to improve a hot sauce 
while avoiding curdling. Linda Larsen, Temper in Baking and Cooking, SPRUCE 
EATS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.thespruceeats.com/learn-the-definition-of-
temper-4050806. Usage of the concept of tempering has been in continuous 
decline since the late 1700s, Definition of ‘Temper’, COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/temper (last visited May 8, 
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we should want law to rule; for what purpose is rule of law a 
good thing? The answer he elaborates in a more developed 
way than in my essay is tempering power so that arbitrary 
abuse of power is checked.19 
Using the example of constitutions, Krygier quotes 
Stephen Holmes on the error of seeing constitutions only as 
a restraint on power. Constitutions are also empowering in 
that they enable infrastructural concentration of power for 
good purposes: 
Limited government is, or can be, more powerful than unlimited 
government. . . . [T]hat constraints can be enabling, which is far 
from being a contradiction, lies at the heart of liberal 
constitutionalism . . . By restricting the arbitrary powers of 
government officials, a liberal constitution can, under the right 
conditions, increase the state’s capacity to focus on specific problems 
and mobilize collective resources for common purposes.20 
Transformative Constitutionalism (in South Africa)21 is 
just one example of the rich variety of tempering traversed 
in this issue. It ranges from immigration activism tempering 
arbitrary power over border crossings,22 to challengers to 
physician domination in health care,23 to state domination in 
China.24 These are just selective examples of the diversity of 
 
2019), though it experienced renewal at the hands of massive NGOs like the 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union in the late nineteenth century. Krygier 
and I have always been yesterday’s men. 
 19. Martin Krygier, What’s the Point of the Rule of Law?, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 
[page #] (2019). 
 20. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY, at xi (1995). 
 21. Heinz Klug, Transformative Constitutions and the Role of Integrity 
Institutions in Tempering Power: The Case of Resistance to State Capture in Post-
Apartheid South Africa, 67 BUFF. L. REV. [page #] (2019). 
 22. Susan Bibler Coutin, “Otro Mundo Es Posible”: Tempering the Power of 
Immigration Law Through Activism, Advocacy, and Action, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 
[page #] (2019). 
 23. Mary Anne Bobinski, Law and Power in Health Care: Challenges to 
Physician Control, 67 BUFF. L. REV. [page #] (2019). 
 24. Kwai Hang Ng, Is China a “Rule-by-Law” Regime?, 67 BUFF. L. REV. [page 
#] (2019). 
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checks on arbitrary power diagnosed across the contributions 
to this volume. Part of the ambition arising from the 
scattered themes of my contribution is the conclusion that 
diverse, plural checks are the heartland of meaningfully 
tempered power. One reason advanced for this is that 
concentrations of power are so variegated in the conditions 
of contemporary capitalism. 
III. MAKING THE THEORY PRACTICAL: TEMPERING 
TYRANNY IN TIMOR 
A. Tempered Power in Timor-Leste 
First, I illustrate what it means to temper power through 
my Timor-Leste work with Hilary Charlesworth and Adérito 
Soares in the book Networked Governance of Freedom and 
Tyranny.25 This research is also used to introduce the 
arguments about tempering financial power later in this 
Article. 
In Indonesia, East Timorese student leadership was 
critical to the people power movement on the streets of 
Jakarta that helped democratize the country and overthrow 
the crony capitalist regime of President Suharto in 1998. In 
the process, East Timorese people power won democracy for 
an independent Timor-Leste. Our book is about how that was 
accomplished by networked governance, after the fulcrum of 
struggle shifted from armed struggle (rather as in South 
Africa’s transition from Apartheid). In Baldy Center terms, 
this was a regulatory community26 led from civil society that 
regulated regime change at the commanding heights of the 
state. But the transition was rocky, punctuated by moments 
of extreme authoritarianism and violence, especially in 2006 
when a UN peacekeeping mission had to return to Timor. 
 
 25. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, HILARY CHARLESWORTH & ADÉRITO SOARES, 
NETWORKED GOVERNANCE OF FREEDOM AND TYRANNY: PEACE IN TIMOR-LESTE 
(2012). 
 26. See Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 L. & 
POL’Y 355 (1987). 
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The problem was that once the new leadership group 
consolidated sovereignty over independent Timor-Leste after 
the 1999 UN referendum, leaders willfully cut themselves off 
from the networks of marginalized people in civil society that 
had helped them humble power in Jakarta in the first place. 
This was rather like what happened with the consolidation 
of sovereignty into the hands of post-Mandela African 
National Congress leaders. Our book displays how weapons 
of the weak in civil society were mobilized a second time to 
temper the power of their President and Prime Minister and 
rebuild a very distinctive and variegated hybrid of separated 
powers in a genuinely democratic Timor-Leste today. The 
mechanisms whereby networked governance by the weak 
can overwhelm great powers, rendering realist international 
relations theory predictively false, has long been a focus of 
Martin Krygier, our research group at the Australian 
National University,27 and yours at the Baldy Center.28 Like 
Krygier in his work on contemporary Eastern Europe,29 we 
focus on the concern that the forces organized against 
domination become sources of domination from the moment 
they assume sovereignty over a state. 
We interpreted the problem with the Timor transition as 
being that it was not republican enough in terms of Philip 
Pettit’s republican political theory.30 Up until 2006, 
transitional governance failed to keep working at 
 
 27. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 10, at 3. 
 28. I interpret Errol Meidinger’s work on the networked power of regulatory 
communities and regulatory cultures in these terms here, and likewise his work 
on civil society environmental institutions like the Forest Stewardship Council. 
See Meidinger, supra note 26; Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global 
Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006). 
 29. See Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota, After Postcommunism: The Next 
Phase, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 299 (2006); Martin Krygier, Virtuous Circles: 
Antipodean Reflections on Power, Institutions, and Civil Society, 11 E. EUR. POL. 
& SOCIETIES 36 (1996); Martin Krygier, Is there Constitutionalism after 
Communism? Institutional Optimism, Cultural Pessimism, and the Rule of Law, 
in THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 77 (Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota 
eds., 2016). 
 30. See PETTIT, supra note 15. 
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institutionalizing tempered power. Yet when their leaders 
directed arbitrary power back at civil society, especially at 
the Catholic Church, civil society re-mobilized and re-
established a richer democracy with tempered power after 
2006. The book’s title, Networked Governance of Freedom 
and Tyranny, signifies networks restraining excesses of 
realist international diplomacy and checking excesses of 
executive domination within a state to deliver republican 
freedom. We define networked governance as the action of 
plural actors linked by coordinating dialogue. Relational 
dialogue encompasses both interdependence and sufficient 
autonomy for different nodes of the network to check and 
balance other nodes of (tempered) power. Networks can only 
govern themselves nodally.31 Inherent in that proposition is 
the fact that even sincere democrats who seize nodal control 
are at risk of corrupting the separation of powers to preserve 
their hard-won power. While networked governance has a 
more variegated horizontal architecture than state 
governance,32 networks of capacity and accountability can be 
linked to every level of multi-level governance. This includes 
every layer of sub-national, national, and international 
hierarchies. Sometimes they are coordinated by state 
regulation, sometimes not. 
We distinguish republican freedom from other 
conceptions by characterizing it as freedom as non-
domination.33 This is the type of freedom delivered by 
 
 31. See Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 30 
(2005); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal 
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401 (2004); Clifford Shearing & Jennifer 
Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New “Denizens”, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 
400 (2003). 
 32. See 1 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY, in THE 
INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (1996); THEORIES OF 
DEMOCRATIC NETWORK GOVERNANCE (Eva Sørensen & Jacob Torfing eds., 2008); 
Eva Sørensen & Jacob Torfing, Making Governance Networks Effective and 
Democratic Through Metagovernance, 87 PUB. ADMIN. 234 (2009). 
 33. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (1990); BRAITHWAITE, CHARLESWORTH & SOARES, 
supra note 25, at 7; PETTIT, supra note 15. 
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tempered power. Networked accountabilities that temper 
power enable regimes to change in ways that prevent one 
form of enslavement from replacing another. Domination can 
be continuously challenged by networks that renew 
themselves with novel ways of checking power that are not 
confined to enduring constitutional balances. Variegation in 
checks and balances is our theme here.34 I join others like 
Jamie Peck35 in this focus on understanding variegated 
capitalism. 
 
 34. With finance, critiques that rely on the neoliberalism trope are rarely 
specific enough to describe what is happening in contemporary capitalism. See 
Andrew Kipnis, Neoliberalism Reified: Suzhi Discourse and Tropes of 
Neoliberalism in the People’s Republic of China, 13 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
INST. 383 (2007). 
 35. See Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Variegated Capitalism, 31 PROGRESS 
HUM. GEOGRAPHY 731 (2007); Jamie Peck, Disembedding Polanyi: Exploring 
Polanyian Economic Geographies, 45 ENV’T & PLAN. A: ECON. & SPACE 1536 
(2013); Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Variegated Neoliberalization: 
Geographies, Modalities, Pathways, 10 GLOBAL NETWORKS 182 (2010); Jamie 
Peck & Jun Zhang, A Variety of Capitalism . . . with Chinese Characteristics?, 13 
J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 357 (2013); Jun Zhang & Jamie Peck, Variegated 
Capitalism, Chinese Style: Regional Models, Multi-Scalar Constructions, 50 
REGIONAL STUD. 52 (2016); see also MARTIN HESS, GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
AND VARIEGATED CAPITALISM: (SELF-)REGULATING LABOUR IN CAMBODIAN 
GARMENT FACTORIES (2013); Adam D. Dixon, Variegated Capitalism and the 
Geography of Finance: Towards a Common Agenda, 35 PROGRESS HUM. 
GEOGRAPHY 193 (2011); Bob Jessop, Capitalist Diversity and Variety: Variegation, 
the World Market, Compossibility and Ecological Dominance, 38 CAPITAL & CLASS 
45 (2014) [hereinafter Jessop, Capitalist Diversity and Variety]; Bob Jessop, 
Comparative Capitalisms and/or Variegated Capitalism, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
COMPARATIVE CAPITALISMS RESEARCH 65 (Matthias Ebenau et al., eds., 2015); 
Kean Fan Lim, On China’s Growing Geo-Economic Influence and the Evolution 
of Variegated Capitalism, 41 GEOFORUM 677 (2010) [hereinafter Lim, On China’s 
Growing Geo-Economic Influence]; Kean Fan Lim, ‘Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’: Uneven Development, Variegated Neoliberalization and the 
Dialectical Differentiation of State Spatiality, 38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 221 
(2014) [hereinafter Lim, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics]; Andreas 
Mulvad, Competing Hegemonic Projects within China’s Variegated Capitalism: 
‘Liberal’ Guangdong vs. ‘Statist’ Chongqing, 20 NEW POL. ECON. 199 (2015); I-
Chun Catherine Chang & Eric Sheppard, China’s Eco-Cities as Variegated Urban 
Sustainability: Dongtan Eco-City and Chongming Eco-Island, 20 J. URB. TECH. 
57 (2013); Ugo Rossi, The Variegated Economics and the Potential Politics of the 
Smart City, 4 TERRITORY POL. GOVERNANCE 337 (2016); Luis Felipe Alvarez León, 
The Digital Economy and Variegated Capitalism, 40 CAN. J. COMM. 637 (2015). 
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The politics of how to temper power in such a world must 
involve variegated separations of powers. One of the more 
exotic variegations we directly witnessed in the 
traditionalist, predominantly rural village society of Timor-
Leste in 2006 was the ritual ripping out of the heart of an 
unfortunate pig in the presence of dead ancestors angered by 
the capricious exercise of power by the country’s cabal of 
leaders. I had a ring-side seat, unfortunately next to the pig. 
There were genuine tears from these party hard-men that 
their people had found it necessary to humble their power 
under the wiser eyes of the ancestors in this way. As a result, 
these leaders genuinely did re-empower the institutions of 
traditional civil society presided over by the ancestors, as 
well as the church, opposition political parties, and to some 
degree the courts and the Constitution after 2006. Somehow 
I fear that invocation of appalled ancestors might not work 
with Donald Trump’s America. For variegation to work it 
must be responsively attuned to local meaning-making. 
Here there is common ground with other theoretical 
traditions that have flourished at the Baldy Center, such as 
critical legal studies,36 in particular the notion of 
“destabilization rights” that Roberto Unger37 introduced. 
Charles Sabel and William Simon38 further developed the 
concept of destabilization rights within the somewhat 
different American pragmatist tradition of “democratic 
experimentalism.” These are rights to unsettle and open up 
state institutions that persistently fail to fulfil their 
functions. Destabilization rights are dynamic checks on 
failures of institutionalized accountabilities to do their job. 
For example, the right to private litigation can destabilize 
 
 36. See generally HAMMILL, supra note 1. 
 37. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
MOVEMENT (1986); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-
NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987). 
 38. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1098–99 (2004). 
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defunct structures of environmental regulation.39 Similarly, 
rights of oppressed minorities can appeal for redress to UN 
institutions. Destabilization rights enable a politics of dis-
entrenchment. Networks can deliver experimental 
innovation by invigorating the separation of powers. The 
state is often too dug in to ancient entrenchments for 
innovation and democratic experimentalism. Western 
doctrine on the separation of powers has stultified because it 
has not been open to learning from the democratic 
experimentalism in civil separations of powers revealed in 
non-Western histories such as that of Timor-Leste, Thailand, 
and China. 
Republics must radically pluralize their vision of how to 
separate and temper powers within the state so the state has 
many branches of separated powers rather than just the 
traditional three (legislature, judiciary, and executive). Can 
we enliven a political imperative for separations of powers 
that progressively become more separated? The history of 
Timor-Leste can be read as one of progressive struggle for 
continuous improvement in securing ever more separated 
powers: not just for Montesquieu’s40 tripartite separation of 
powers among an executive, legislature and judiciary, but for 
much more variegated and indigenously attuned separations 
of ever more powers; not just separations of government 
powers, but division of both private and public powers. We 
documented dozens of separated powers in response to 
Timor-Leste’s post-conflict dominations. In a similar way, 
President Eisenhower’s concept of breaking up the military-
industrial complex in the United States captures this idea of 
a newly identified variegation of power that had to be 
tempered in the 1950s.41 Capitalism is a continuous process 
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of creatively destroying old concentrations of power and 
constituting even more worrying ones. Hence the struggle for 
freedom must be more than struggle for a new democratic 
constitution that guarantees a conclusive separation of 
powers. It must be contestation of an ever-evanescent 
constitutionalism that struggles to continuously deepen 
separations of powers at every stage of a nation’s history. 
B. The Promise of Republicanism 
Republicanism is conceived as a political philosophy of 
continuous struggle for more effective complexes of 
separated powers.42 A republic is an unfinished struggle 
towards a polity where each separated power has sufficient 
clout to exercise its own functions with support from other 
separated powers. This is not a new perspective. Hannah 
Arendt quoted Benjamin Rush who in 1787 complained of 
those who confuse the struggles of the “American revolution 
with those of the late American war. The American war is 
over: but this is far from being the case with the American 
revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the 
great drama is closed.”43 
A republic is a polity where no one center of power is so 
dominant that it can crush any other separated power 
without the other separated powers mobilizing to push back 
that domination. In our book on Timor-Leste, we are at one 
with Holmes and Krygier on the imperative to have a 
positively empowering vision of the constitution: 
Republicanism does not require powers that are so diffused that 
separated powers cannot act decisively. The executive is empowered 
to declare war, the judge to declare guilt, the legislature to declare 
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laws. Decisiveness for the judge is actually enhanced by the 
knowledge that only an appellate court can overturn her decision on 
an error of law; she cannot be dominated by a prime minister who 
demands the acquittal of a political crony. Decisiveness for a 
constable on the street is knowing that she is the one with the power 
to decide whether to arrest a judge who appears to assault his wife; 
then it is no longer in her hands but in the hands of the separated 
powers of a prosecutor. Decisiveness for a general is knowing that 
once the executive declares war, she can conduct it in accordance 
with laws of war approved by the legislature, without interference 
from politicians who think of themselves as armchair generals. 
Of course, a mature constitutional debate is needed to finetune 
separated powers to ensure that each can decisively perform its 
function without domination from any centralising power and 
without confusion as to who exercises each separated power, and 
under what norms. None of this is to deny that democracies must at 
times debate trade-offs between greater accountability and greater 
efficiency. Separated powers of civil society and the media to speak 
assertively during those constitutional debates are critical elements 
of separated powers that get the separation clear and effective.44 
We argue that dynamism is a neglected topic in 
discussion of the separation of powers. One of the things 
republican revolutions have done throughout history is dis-
entrench powers, such as the powers of kings and dictators. 
Destabilization rights and “democratic experimentalism,”45 
as mentioned above, unsettle and open up state institutions 
that persistently fail to fulfil their functions. Networks are 
needed to deliver experimental innovation in the 
invigoration of separations of powers because of state 
propensities to rigidify. 
One risk of richly separated powers is that they will 
result in gridlock. We argue that networked separations of 
powers are themselves the best ways of tempering the 
inefficiency of gridlock: 
Our argument has been that, for most tasks of modern 
governance, networks get things done better than hierarchies. Well-
designed networks of power are not only mutually checking upon 
bad uses of power; they are also mutually enabling of good 
capacities for power. Networks must be coordinated and 
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sometimes—not always—the state is the best candidate to supply a 
key node of coordination. For most problems, strengthening state 
hierarchy to solve problems is not as effective as strengthening 
checks and balances on hierarchy as we also strengthen private–
public partnerships, professions with technocratic expertise on that 
problem, civil society engagement and vigilance, and other 
networks of governance, while at the same time strengthening 
coordination of networked governance. The most effective 
governance is rarely centrally monopolised; it is usually messily 
attentive to multiple accountabilities. 
This is not to deny that there must be agreement on who will 
make the final call on matters that have not reached resolution after 
deep contestation under a separation of powers. Elections are one 
such state institution with this usefully ultimate capacity to break 
a logjam (without violence). So are state courts. On legal matters, 
as valuable as it is to have a rich tapestry of legal pluralism where 
the national rugby judiciary regulates most violence on rugby fields, 
it is also valuable to have state appellate courts that have the 
legitimacy to make ultimate decisions on the basis of a synoptic view 
of all the adjudication that has occurred across that tapestry. 
· · · · 
Gridlock is a risk of separated powers. Often it is more important 
that things are settled than settled right. Paralysis and 
disengagement in the face of great problems are profound risks, not 
only in times of war. Executive government has an oversight 
responsibility for ensuring that really big problems do not fall 
between the cracks. This is not the same as saying the government 
should fix them. It is to say that the state has a responsibility to 
take a synoptic view of a society, and to catalyse action when lesser 
actors are paralysed by the enormity of the challenge. We see this 
need most acutely at times of great natural disasters when so many 
leaders of civil society are busy bailing out their house or looking for 
lost families. One of the great examples of a chief executive with 
synoptic vision in the twentieth century was China’s Deng Xiaoping 
when he saw in 1978 that the institutions of state production were 
bogged down. He opened up the Chinese economy to private 
institutions that broke through many of the production bottlenecks 
and bureaucratic gridlocks that were grinding the economy to a 
halt. 
We might even say that the most important role of state political 
leaders is to be gridlock breakers: to get that budget through the 
legislative contestation process, to issue an ultimatum to an enemy 
state of a kind that has less meaning when only a general issues it. 
Yet the ultimate power to break gridlock resides with the people 
when they take to the streets in a revolutionary moment in which 
they persuade the media or the military to side with the revolution. 
Republicans hope these will be revolutionary moments that dis-
entrench bad power and entrench new separations of powers that 
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secure freedom from domination.46 
IV. TEMPERING WALL STREET 
This theoretical architecture on networked regulation to 
temper power will now be applied to the regulation of the 
commanding heights of corporate power. It will then inform 
a more multi-level account of tempering contemporary 
capitalism. 
The 2008 financial crisis in the United States did not 
occur because of a failure to temper power in any classic 
Montesquieu sense:47 the U.S. executive government did not 
crush a legislature that was trying to implement the 
regulatory reforms needed to prevent the crisis. Likewise, 
the crash did not occur because the courts were insufficiently 
independent of the President and the legislature. One reason 
it did occur was that ratings agencies, which are paid to hold 
the solvency of banks and hedge funds to account, were 
insufficiently independent of the private interests they were 
rating. Boards of directors of great banks exercised 
insufficient independence of judgment over leveraging, over 
the hedge fund traders and the housing loan brokers who 
made them rich. Board audit committees failed. Major 
accounting firms failed to blow the whistle in countless 
cases—a lesson that should have been learned from the 
previous 2001 downturn when Arthur Andersen failed to do 
its job of auditing with independence Enron, WorldCom, and 
other companies that collapsed.48 
The Global Financial Crisis was not caused by a failure 
of the tripartite separation of powers in the public sector, but 
by a failure of powers to be sufficiently separated within the 
private sector. More profoundly, there were failures of public 
branches of power to be sufficiently separated from Wall 
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Street power. The legislature and executive failed to enact 
and enforce regulations requiring these culpable private 
powers to be separated and tempered. Financial regulators 
were insufficiently independent of the president, and of a 
legislature captured by a Wall Street that had funded their 
election. And there was a failure of the IMF to call U.S. 
monetary imbalance to account in the way it is so willing to 
do with powerless states. It was a failure of the ratings 
agencies to call the big institutions of American capitalism to 
account in a way they might have had the culpable banks 
been banks in more marginal economies. What then followed 
was the failure of the New York Stock Exchange to deliver 
financial transparency, and failure of the global banking 
regulators at Basel to call U.S. bank regulators to account in 
a way they might have had the banking regulators and 
monetary institutions been in weaker states. 
In the separation of economic powers in multi-level 
governance, as in the separation of state powers, it is 
important that an independent sphere of action for each 
power is guaranteed. Each separated power of business 
regulation must not be dominated by any one power calling 
the shots above all others. Of course, there may be situations 
where a dictator who calls the shots can increase economic 
efficiency by overruling a court or a regulator that is 
needlessly slowing investment that would benefit the people. 
The experience of history, however, is that autocrats more often 
exercise their domination for corrupt and patrimonial purposes that 
reduce the efficiency of national resource allocation. So in the long 
run many separations of powers that seem inefficient to the 
politically naive are in practice economically efficient. 
Part of the efficiency dividend from separations of powers that are 
attuned to local realities is from a more efficient division of labour. 
Because central bank board members focus their intelligence and 
training on the large and intricate challenge of securing monetary 
balance for an economy, they are likely to make better decisions of 
this specialist kind than are the generalist politicians of the cabinet. 
Because police training is in community policing that enrols the 
community to do most of the serious business of crime control, they 
become better at it than the military with their training and 
experience in the use of maximum force. Our Timor-Leste narrative 
has well illustrated the provocation and inefficiency that can arise 
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when the military takes over public order policing.49 
With these historical lessons in hand of hedged virtues 
of variegated separations that temper financial power, let us 
now consider more deeply the contemporary challenges of 
variegated capitalism to which separated powers must 
respond. 
V. TEMPERING VARIEGATED CAPITALISM 
A. Variegating Capitalism to Architectural Regulation 
Clifford Shearing and Philip Stenning wrote in 2003 
about how Disney World regulates its little customers to 
keep them safe.50 Basically it channels them into queues of 
children tall enough for particular rides and into machines 
with an architecture of bars. It does not regulate them by 
punishing them for behaving in an unsafe or disorderly way. 
It makes it impossible for them to stand up dangerously or 
to wave. This is accomplished by bars that encase them. 
Their arms are prevented from being ripped off not by a 
normative order, not by a punitive order, but by architectural 
regulation. 
At the time, this seemed a quaint, exotic work. But after 
the rise of Silicon Valley capitalism, what Lawrence Lessig 
called “architectural regulation” became quite dominant.51 
Microsoft, then Google and Facebook came to architecturally 
regulate us through the internet. They steer how events flow 
through our lives.52 Tech giants steer us to their favored 
software products; they steer us to their customized news 
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services (now purged of fake news of course); to products that 
pay a premium to jump to the head of the queue in search 
engines; they are harnessed by clever Russian intelligence 
operatives to steer votes; harnessed by National Security 
Agency programs with vivid code names like Muscular and 
Prism that monitor our movements.53 In free societies 
Facebook and Google allow us to see WikiLeaks revelations 
about how the national security state works. Authoritarian 
societies steer us away from seeing secrets of the deep state. 
If we live in Myanmar, the sixty Burmese language Facebook 
censors Mark Zuckerberg employed in June 2018 deploy the 
architectural regulation of cyberspace to interrupt genocidal 
hate speech for the cleansing of Rohingya.54 Spookiness is the 
business model of this stalker economy in cyberspace. It is a 
variegation of capitalism that gives us a lot of free stuff if we 
agree to be tracked. When the product is free, people 
increasingly realize that they are the product. Twitter, 
LinkedIn, Snapchat, Facebook, and others commodify the 
very networking that we argued in the Timor case study to 
be citizens’ crucial bulwark against tyranny. 
Former Baldy Student Fellow, Natasha Tusikov, has 
brilliantly dissected this new regulatory challenge.55 She 
shows how networking generates troves of data that can be 
exploited by advertisers, pornographers, and the deep state 
alike. The data comes from all the companies mentioned, as 
well as others like eBay, PayPal, and Yahoo. So enmeshed 
are the connections between the national security state and 
internet capital that Eisenhower’s threat of the military-
industrial complex is now surpassed by a deep-state-Silicon-
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Valley complex.56 It is an information-syphoning intelligence 
complex. Tusikov illustrates the potential for architectural 
self-regulation of cyberspace at “chokepoints.”57 Global 
internet firms exert control at these chokepoints for the 
commercial purpose of catching people who purloin 
intellectual property. How does the largely U.S. and U.K. 
state regulation to accomplish this chokepoint self-
regulation work? It is, Tusikov finds, mostly through 
conversation with the internet giants rather than punitive or 
litigious. It works by an architecture of the internet giants 
controlling flows of information at chokepoints, tracking 
down counterfeiters, blocking their access to vital 
commercial and technical services, and disabling websites 
used by counterfeiters. 
Political leaders, captured by intellectual property 
interests and by the deep state, grant considerably 
untempered powers to these gatekeepers of cyberspace. Even 
when Facebook does good, it does bad because of the 
untempered quality of its hegemony. While it may be good 
that Facebook seeks to stop advocacy of Islamic terrorism on 
the internet, it threatens freedom when that script allows it 
to be co-opted by the government of India to crush free speech 
among Muslims in Kashmir protesting the very real tyranny 
and denial of human rights they suffer at the hands of a 
Hindu regime.58 Who guards these guardians? Only invisible 
deep states. Do citizens have a say in gatekeeping decisions 
about what does and does not cross the line into child 
pornography, who is a terrorist and who is a freedom-fighter, 
what is obscenity and what is art, what is counterfeiting and 
what is life-saving production of legal generic drugs? No. 
Tusikov shows that chokepoint regulation is powerful 
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architectural regulation without law and without democratic 
accountability of any meaningful kind. Not only that, the 
“rule of men” can mean men in trench coats from just two 
states, the United States and United Kingdom (which count 
among only a handful of net intellectual property-exporting 
states). They rule over the citizens of almost two hundred 
other states (which are net intellectual property importers), 
from Australia to Argentina to Africa. In other words, states 
that benefit from the highest levels of expansive intellectual 
property monopoly rights are the informal rulemakers; 
citizens of states with an interest in tempered monopoly are 
ruletakers. Rule by “secret handshake deals” between 
executives of the U.S. state and its internet giants happened 
precisely because laws in the Congress to achieve the same 
result ran up against massive citizen protests inside the 
United States, and globally. An “Internet Blackout” on 
January 18, 2012 was the most effective and widely 
democratic online protest the world had ever seen, shutting 
down many major websites, including Wikipedia and 
Google.59 
What is mostly gagged in Tusikov’s chokepoint 
regulation is access to income through cutting off payment 
services, access to advertising, search, marketplaces, and 
domain name services. Details of the regulatory technology 
are not important here, nor of how Tusikov accessed secret 
non-legal relational regulation by interrogating Edward 
Snowden’s disclosures. What matters is Tusikov’s insight 
that a major new variegation of capitalism can grow quickly 
to include the wealthiest corporations on the planet. 
Completely new modalities of regulation can spring up that 
have a certain effectiveness but that have no legal 
underpinning. These new forms of regulation work globally 
simply as relational regulation backed by coercive 
capabilities of the untempered “rule of men” from two 
commanding states. More fundamentally, Tusikov’s work 
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shows how regulation cannot keep up with variegations of 
capitalism unless it is agile, innovative,60 and relational. 
B. Variegations of Capitalism 
Peter Hall and David Soskice’s research defined two 
“Varieties of Capitalism,” both based on assemblages of 
national policies, including regulatory ones.61 Both varieties 
are successful capitalisms. One is the liberal market 
capitalism of which the United States and United Kingdom 
are lead examples; the second is the coordinated market 
capitalism of which Germany or Scandinavia are prominent 
examples. Coordinated market capitalism historically has 
stronger labor rights. These rights delivered lifetime 
employment and capacities of workplace democratic 
participation that produced committed employees, then vital 
to excellence in sophisticated engineering. An example of this 
is the production of better, safer cars in Germany and 
Sweden than in the United States or United Kingdom, by 
Mercedes Benz in Germany and Volvo in Sweden.62 These 
countries also tended, according to Hall and Soskice, to have 
antitrust laws that were permissive to collaboration and 
technology sharing agreements between firms that 
supported sophisticated engineering excellence. Germany 
and Scandinavia have not been as successful as the United 
States or United Kingdom in investment banking, however. 
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Deregulated labor markets and short-term responsiveness to 
increasing shareholder value proved a better fit to the bonus 
and burnout culture of twenty-four-hour trading. Though 
this may have been the case in the past, the labor markets of 
coordinated market economies have become more 
deregulated: post-Brexit, Frankfurt may learn to become a 
financialization powerhouse, and antitrust policies have 
become more globally convergent over time. 
The two capitalisms described above can be conceived as 
two points that are reasonably close together along a wider 
continuum of variegated capitalisms.63 Afghanistan is much 
further along that continuum, at the opposite end from these 
North Atlantic twin peaks. “Ceasefire capitalism” in 
Myanmar64 is closer to Afghanistan than to Western Europe. 
The capitalism across the border from Myanmar in the 
poorer South-Western corner of China is somewhat 
wealthier, but also closer to Myanmar capitalism than to 
Western Europe, while some of the great industrial capitalist 
regions further to the East of China are more like the 
European industrial capitalism of sixty years ago. At the 
same time, the information technology and national security 
state capitalism of Beijing are more like Silicon Valley and 
Pentagon-coordinated national security state capitalism.65 
The latter involves competitive tournaments among teams of 
cooperative firms to win the contract for the weapons system 
of a submarine; then another competition among firms to 
build the vessel itself; and another to build IT systems, all 
before competing combinations of those firms are pitched 
against each other to produce competing integrated designs. 
This approach is revealed in the work of Michael Dorf and 
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Charles Sabel,66 and is mixed in with large doses of 
industrial espionage by the Chinese national security state. 
There is also a massive rural village agricultural capitalism 
in China that produces most of what is required to feed its 
huge population. It is a hybrid of a feudal past, 
collectivization, modern agri-businesses, and state-owned 
corporations, that is also tied to traditional rural Confucian 
values that the Communist Party embraces in the project of 
motivating agricultural workers into patriarchal bonds of 
loyalty and harmony. Business in some pockets of China is 
more privatized and experiences less Communist Party 
micro-management: there are eleven free trade zones which 
have no direct customs, lower tax, less red tape, and 
supposedly unfiltered internet approximating more liberal 
market conditions.67 In contrast, while a large province like 
Xinjiang can have a flourishing tourist industry and some 
factories, its total domination by the Communist Party and 
its deep state surveillance (worst of all its massive 
internment system driven by fear of Islamic terror and 
Caliphate rhetoric) gives Xinjiang little prospect of 
flourishing with any of the sophisticated variegations of 
Chinese capitalism. Chinese financialization by banks is 
massive, concentrated at nodes (particularly Shanghai and 
the entrepot financialization of Hong Kong), and even less 
transparent than London and New York financialization. 
The main difference is that the two biggest mega banks are 
state-owned and are connected to persisting Communist 
Party imperatives to directly manage the financial system as 
any impending crisis approaches.68 The main point of all this 
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is to say that variegation of capitalism within China is 
huge.69 While Chinese capitalism overall is authoritarian 
compared to the more liberal capitalism of the United States, 
these generalized tropes mask diversity too much. 
Turning to the United States, the U.S. economy is 
variegated in many ways that mirror Chinese variegation, 
but with privately-owned rather than state-owned mega 
banks. American variegation is particularly distinguished by 
a large underclass economy of illegal immigrants in a service 
economy that meets a galaxy of needs of affluent Americans 
for cleaners, serving staff in mega-chains from McDonald’s 
to Walmart, taxi drivers, carers of the young and the old, and 
various underground markets. Casual agricultural workers 
are also part of this immigrant precariat.70 The success of 
American variegations of capitalism is significantly built on 
a foundation of cheap food and services for highly paid 
knowledge economy workers in organizations that lead the 
world in domains ranging from universities to information 
technology. 
The United States has a far larger national security state 
than any other. Torch-bearers for neoliberalism Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan did not believe in a small state 
when it came to national security. They spent big on armies, 
police, and on security hardware. Linda Weiss has 
persuasively documented a connection between the 
neoconservatism that accompanied the neoliberalism of 
Reagan’s followers and the booming of the U.S. economy 
amidst the ashes of its deindustrialized wastelands.71 Weiss 
sees the fact that the United States is a national security 
state as key to its economic success in recent decades. 
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Development of the internet was driven forward by the 
Pentagon and the British state. Both national economies 
benefitted greatly from being early movers in this, as with 
early movement into drone and robot technologies in this 
century, significantly motivated by ambitions for 
surveillance drones and killer robots. America invested 
massively in private-public partnerships in information 
technology, in particular when this was seen as vital to the 
domination of new weapons and surveillance systems. No 
scholar has undertaken the careful research of Weiss on 
other states that have invested in large ways in the 
technology of a national security state—the United Kingdom, 
France, Russia, China, Israel, South Africa (during 
Apartheid) and Japan (more recently). Yet it does not seem 
a wild hypothesis that these countries have also derived 
major benefits in building similar variegation into their 
capitalism. 
While the United States is supposedly an outlier as a 
privatized liberal market economy, its public universities, for 
example, are massive exporters of higher education services 
to global markets. In Australia, also supposedly a liberal 
market economy, state universities are almost entirely 
responsible for the country’s third biggest export industry 
(higher education).72 The United States is like China in 
having a balance of publicly-driven and privately-driven 
variegations to its export capitalism. 
The United States also has other capitalisms. These 
include: a micro-corporate venture capitalism that launches 
start-ups, some of which later become global tech 
corporations; a Silicon Valley capitalism of giants like 
Facebook and Google that have already acquired an ability 
to regulate globally as revealed by Natasha Tusikov;73 
 
 72. See AUSTL. TRADE COMM’N, AUSTRALIA’S EXPORT PERFORMANCE IN FY2017, 
at 5 (2017), https://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/5720/Australias_ 
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monopoly capitalism grounded in intellectual property rights 
that allow monopolists of particular knowledge markets, 
such as pharmaceuticals, to exclude competitors;74 growing 
“share economies” of cooperatives like Uber and Airbnb that 
require minimal infrastructure beyond internet and roads; 
and substantial remnants of the old industrial capitalism—
making cars and steel, for example. The United States is the 
world leader in the commodification of sport, from American 
football to baseball, basketball, tennis, golf, and more. 
As variegated as U.S. capitalism is in this narrative, it is 
different from authoritarian capitalist societies like China or 
Russia,75 and from coordinated market economies like 
Germany. Variegated capitalism is partly about the idea that 
many different capitalisms co-exist in different spaces/times, 
or different markets within one country—a more liberal 
market in this sector or space, a more coordinated market in 
another, more authoritarian capitalism somewhere else. 
While it is clear that it is important to see the variegation 
of capitalism and to be careful about sweeping tropes like 
“neoliberalism” as a description of America under the 
authoritarian interventionism of President Trump, it is also 
important to see how bits of the variegation become globally 
interdependent. Americans might not approve of the 
corporations that provide them with cheap lap-tops and 
smart phones by exploiting slave laborers in Congolese 
coltan mines. They may disapprove the exploitation of 
immiserated factory workers in Bangladesh that delivers 
their clothing brands. Yet they increasingly understand that 
their ability to purchase cheap clothing and smart phones, 
and the profits in their pension funds, depend on this. So 
they mostly look away from the comprador symbiosis 
between neoliberal and authoritarian capitalism. They 
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understand that the corporations that build their pensions 
prefer to manufacture in authoritarian countries where they 
can pay local managers or Communist Party fixers to deal 
with the bribes to make labor or environmental laws go 
away. Liberal capitalism in this way digs its own grave and 
empowers authoritarian capitalism in its competition with 
it. 
The arrival of protectionist provocateurs beyond just 
Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and the new generation 
Eastern European authoritarians raises the question 
whether we are approaching peak globalization in the free 
movement of goods and services. The authoritarianism of 
such politicians suggests that perhaps we have already 
passed peak liberalism and peak democracy. There was a 
time when Americans thought the fall of Communism would 
lead to a liberal Eastern Europe, and the Arab Spring and 
the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan would lead to a liberal 
Middle East and Central Asia. Some thought it was only a 
matter of time before there would be another Tiananmen 
Square to liberalize China. They thought that the people 
power revolution of 1986 in their former Philippines colony 
would lead to liberalism, where instead we see 
authoritarianism apace with President Duterte. Americans 
thought Aung San Su Kyi would liberalize Myanmar—
instead she left it in the hands of genocidal generals and 
their authoritarian business cronies who own the banks and 
most big business. 
The fastest growing economies since the Global 
Financial Crisis have not been the neoliberal economies. 
They have been large authoritarian capitalist economies like 
China and Bangladesh that have been growing at two or 
three times the rate of neoliberal economies for decades. 
Since the Global Financial Crisis, even more authoritarian 
crony capitalist economies in Asia, such as Cambodia, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines, have also grown at two or 
three times the clip of the western economies. Many of the 
biggest countries with populations approaching 100 million 
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or more have rejected neoliberalism in favor of their own 
version of authoritarian capitalism. Shifts from neoliberal to 
authoritarian capitalism have been particularly sharp in 
Eastern European economies such as Poland, Hungary and 
the former Yugoslavian republics since the Global Financial 
Crisis. Some other large economies are doing well as they 
move away from authoritarianism toward an intermediate 
position between liberal and authoritarian capitalism: 
examples of this kind of high growth economy of middling 
authoritarianism are Indonesia and India. Others like the 
United Arab Emirates and the Philippines are recording 
strong growth as they move in the opposite direction toward 
more authoritarian hybrids of capitalism. And of course, 
American corporate profits boomed in the first two years of 
the Trump presidency thanks to his tax cuts and perhaps 
even in the short-term to beggar-thy-neighbor aggression in 
trade negotiations. India is a key swing state of this contest 
among different liberal-authoritarian hybrids. It 
understands that it loses factory investment to Bangladesh 
and China because in these more authoritarian states it has 
been easier for brands to contrive to evade labor laws or 
environmental enforcement. 
Now we will turn to consider first if it is possible to 
temper the power of variegated forms of financial capitalism, 
and second how to regulate labor standards. This will be 
considered across the wide global variegations of liberalism 
and authoritarianism we have canvassed. 
VI. TEMPERED FINANCIALIZATION OF CAPITALISM 
A. Banks Taking Over 
Banks are hard to regulate because they own much of 
everything, including politicians.76 Banker power has a 
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stronger interest than any other sector of the economy in 
holding down the wages share of national income.77 This is 
because the only way for policymakers to keep the economy 
growing when workers do not have enough money in their 
pockets to sustain demand is policy settings that entice 
workers into deeper debt than they can sustain when times 
get bad. The other alternative is through export growth, that 
states are less able to control than debt or wage shares. The 
more workers borrow, the higher the profits for banks. This 
is why there is a positive correlation between private credit 
to GDP ratios in financialized economies and growth in stock 
prices.78 While unsustainable debt suits the banks, it is bad 
for the rest of us. And unsustainable debt is only good for 
banks until there is a crash like 2008. Recent evidence 
suggests that a high household debt to GDP ratio may 
substantially increase GDP in the short term but 
substantially reduce it in the long term, and as that ratio 
increases, the dampening impact on long-run growth also 
increases.79 Even when there is a crash, smart individuals in 
the financial sector move their massive bonuses from the 
good times into safe havens, and in the best case even make 
a killing by shorting the market before a crash, a crash that 
they can more clearly see coming than the rest of us.80 
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Regardless of the more complex long-term veracity of a 
causal relationship between private debt and bank 
profitability, the important thing is that banks act as if they 
believe the relationship exists by paying employees huge 
bonuses for selling more debt. Several econometric studies 
suggest an inverted-U relationship between economic growth 
and the size of the financial sector. Beyond a tipping point 
when financialization gets too dominant relative to the rest 
of the economy, economic growth starts to decline as 
financialization grows, for reasons that are not yet clear.81 
There are many definitions of the recent surge in the 
financialization of capitalism. I like Rudolf Hilferding’s82 
century-old definition of financialization as increasing 
political and economic power of banks and the rentier class 
(rentiers are those who live off income from investments in 
property or securities rather than from producing anything). 
Financial profits as a share of U.S. GDP were about 10 
percent in the 1950s.83 By the early 2000s, financial profits 
hit an all-time high of about 40 percent of total profits.84 This 
figure fell back to less than 30 per cent after the Global 
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Financial Crisis, but has now surged well past 30 per cent 
again.85 Financialization is a particularly strong trend in 
command economies. In the Forbes 2000 list of the most 
powerful corporations in the world for 2018, the first, second, 
fifth, ninth, and tenth places are occupied by Communist 
Chinese banks that are mostly state owned.86 When 
Australians look at their pension portfolios and note that 
their biggest investments by far are in the Big Four 
Australian banks, they think the Australian economy has 
become highly financialized compared with the era when 
mining and industrial corporations dominated their 
portfolios. In fact, however, foreign banks, particularly 
HSBC, JP Morgan, and Citicorp own a hefty proportion of 
Australian banks. Australia’s Big Four banks in turn own 
more than a quarter of all ASX companies,87 with another 
substantial proportion of ASX companies being owned by 
smaller Australian banks, foreign banks, or mega insurance 
companies.88 
B. Micro-Regulation of Financial Capital 
While there was an encouraging surge in global 
regulation of banks after the 2008 crisis, this represented 
quite moderate regulatory growth.89 It was prudent for Basel 
to require all large international banks to have higher 
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reserves as a cushion for future shocks, to be less trusting of 
markets to decide on the veracity of financial products, and 
wise to seek national commitments to curtail the 
irresponsible activities of financial institutions. That said, 
financial regulation cannot be effective unless it is highly 
variegated and adaptive to context and to new financial 
engineering innovations. One salutary lesson of the Global 
Financial Crisis in this respect came from Poland. Polish 
financial regulators were without hubris in the mid-2000s; 
they adopted the view that they were not a financially 
sophisticated economy and their regulatory capacities were 
less developed than in big economies.90 While it could make 
sense in Britain and the United States for regulators to 
license banks that traded in complex derivatives, it was more 
prudent for Poland to tell its banks that it would not renew 
their licenses if they traded significantly in complex financial 
products that their regulators did not understand. These 
decisions left Poland’s banks less touched by derivatives 
tainted with sliced and diced U.S. sub-prime mortgages than 
in the rest of Europe, and Poland recovered from 2008 with 
higher growth rates than any other European country.91 
Many individual banks in Canada, Australia, and Asia 
(where so many had been burnt by the 1998 Asian Financial 
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Crisis) adopted the same humility as the Polish regulators. 
In the case of Australia, there was a high level of 
securitization of housing loans by the big banks, but these 
were overwhelmingly Australian loans which were well-
understood and understood to be prudent by world standards 
in 2008. Even at Lehman Brothers in the 2000s there were a 
number of prominent humble senior bankers who thought 
the firm was becoming too highly leveraged into too many 
derivatives that were not sufficiently transparent in their 
relationship to complex risks in real estate markets. These 
people were marginalized, with their views seen as a risk to 
short-run profits and bonuses; in some instances, they left 
because no one was listening to their pleas to temper the 
hubris.92 
It is the most sophisticated, aggressive, bonus-driven 
and liberal finance markets in New York and London that 
are most difficult to temper. They pose the deepest global 
risks. Yet even within the United States there are more and 
less aggressive, more and less innovative and risk-taking 
institutions. In tempering banking power, one size cannot fit 
all. Responsive regulatory theory suggests that a relational 
species of regulation with a significant portion of restorative 
justice can be a helpful first port of call for strengthening the 
hand of the temperate, ethical insiders before they are 
pushed towards the door.93 
I have argued that the global financial crisis might have 
been prevented this way.94 The FBI from 2004, if not 
considerably earlier, was seeing a great deal of evidence of 
an epidemic of mortgage fraud in fraud monitoring 
 
 92. Rear Vision: The Legacy of the Global Financial Crisis, ABC RN (Sept. 16, 
2018, 12:05 PM) (audio download available at http://www.abc.net.au 
/radionational/programs/rearvision/the-legacy-of-the-global-financial-
crisis/10195876). 
 93. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10; 
Braithwaite, supra note 48. 
 94. Braithwaite, supra note 48. 
2019] TEMPERED POWER 563 
databases.95 FBI leaders suffered from the pathology of being 
a prosecutorial rather than a preventive regulator. The FBI 
did not see it as a prosecutorial priority to confront the petty 
frauds of lenders who said they had a job when they did not. 
Had they embraced a more preventive orientation, they 
might have discussed with prudential regulators whether 
this massive upsurge in petty fraud causing housing loan 
defaults was a red flag of risk for American finance. 
Eventually they might have found that investors on Wall 
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Street who were looking at the same data were setting 
themselves for a killing with “The Big Short” of those 
securitized bad loans.96 Relational regulators might then 
have sat down with the banks that were approving the 
greatest numbers of defaulting loans and asked them why 
they were so much worse than other banks and what could 
they do to repair this harm. We know now that this would 
have revealed a systemic pattern of “liar loans” in which 
working class people were groomed to exaggerate their 
incomes. Then these banks sliced and diced the loans into 
securities and sold unmanaged risks far and wide. At the 
very least, the depth of the global recession could have been 
reduced through this kind of relational regulation, a type of 
regulation that did not waste time on prosecutions with 
cooperating banks but focused instead on preventing ever-
growing numbers of poor people being foisted with debts they 
could not sustain. Yes, more bankers should have gone to 
prison by 2019, but in 2004 the priority was relational 
prevention of more people being bankrupted into poverty. 
With a stringent enough focus of regulatory pressure, 
most banks would likely have played ball with relational 
regulation by hiring independent auditors to report honestly 
on what was going wrong with their lending practices. Most 
banks probably would have voluntarily complied with 
regulatory demands to reform their lending practices, 
dispense with culpable brokers, discipline their own staff, 
and repair damage by helping to restructure loans that were 
impossible for poor people to repay. Many, however, would 
have refused to do these things and stonewalled regulators. 
Financial regulators have no shortage of powers in such 
circumstances to march in and do their own audit of bad 
loans. When this escalation did not evoke cooperation and de-
escalation to relational regulation, they could escalate 
further by starting to launch prosecutions against banks and 
individual executives for fraud. If cooperation then occurred, 
 
 96. See LEWIS, supra note 80. 
2019] TEMPERED POWER 565 
prosecutions could be deferred, contingent on the quality of 
the reforms and the offer of help to poor lenders who were in 
trouble. If compassionate support for struggling families was 
not even forthcoming after that, regulators could have made 
an example of these banks by securing mug shots of their 
chief executives on the front page of the Wall Street Journal. 
Responsive regulation underwrites the presumptive 
preference for relational and compassionate regulation with 
escalation to tough stuff at the peak of the regulatory 
pyramid.97 In the very worst cases of fraud and intransigence 
to reform, corporate capital punishment is a more robust 
remedy before the collapse of banks: withdrawal of their 
license, state takeover, and restructuring of the bank’s 
affairs. 
C. Responsive Structural Regulation of Financial Capital 
After the event, in 2008 and 2009, financial institutions 
had collapsed as a result of their folly. What then? It follows 
from the financialization of capitalism that the largest banks 
in big economies can be too big to fail. The U.S. government 
made the correct decision in saving Bear Stearns and other 
systemically important financial institutions from collapse. 
It probably should have gone further and also used taxpayer 
funds to save Lehman Brothers from going under, because 
that was the immediate trigger of a global freezing up of 
capital markets. Likewise, British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown did the right thing in bailing out his big banks. Yet in 
the long run, political leaders must not privatize capitalism’s 
profits and socialize its losses. In one important sense, the 
United Kingdom (and other European governments such as 
Germany’s) did a better job than the United States, because 
Britain insisted on taxholder equity in failing banks like 
Lloyds. These shares could be sold when the market 
inevitably rose again.98 Even if the British taxpayer might 
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sell these shares at a loss, one solution is making up the 
shortfall later by a special tax on banks of the kind Australia 
imposed in 2017.99 In a related way, if China and other 
authoritarian capitalist states are willing to pull socialist 
levers to deal proactively with crises, and neoliberal 
economies like the United Kingdom and United States are 
not, it is the authoritarian capitalist economies that may 
survive in the long run. 
In their own ways, these governments showed that only 
resort to temporary socialist solutions can save capitalism in 
a major crisis. Obama was quite assertively socialist when 
he bailed out General Motors. General Motors (and Chrysler) 
came to him in 2008 with the message that he had no 
alternative but to bail them out. Presidents had done this in 
past crises, where they were later rewarded by fat campaign 
contributions as the auto industry returned to profit. Obama 
behaved differently than past Presidents in 2008. He did 
deploy vast taxpayer funds to temporarily socialize the auto 
industry’s losses. But in the process, he fired the General 
Motors CEO Rick Wagoner.100 He announced that he wanted 
renewed top management that would give the auto industry 
states of Michigan and Ohio a sustainable future by greening 
the industry. This was an apt response to sclerosis in a 
business that had learnt it was cheaper to invest in political 
lobbying than in innovation. By 2013, Obama had seen the 
release of a General Motors environmental sustainability 
report card that revealed some progress toward greener 
factories that produce greener cars. This enterprise has 
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continued: despite Donald Trump’s avowals to kill off 
Obama’s sustainability agenda,101 General Motors made a 
commitment in 2016 that it would source all electrical power 
for its 350 operations in 59 countries with renewable energy 
by 2050.102 Partly because of these governance changes, 
American autos became more competitive with European 
and Asian cars. Voters of Michigan and Ohio were grateful 
to Obama in the 2012 Presidential election for saving their 
economies. 
Neither Obama nor Brown were tough enough with 
banks that by 2019 had returned to impressive profitability. 
It would have been just and economically sound to introduce 
something like the 2017 Australian special tax on banks to 
force British and U.S. banks to pay their taxpayers back for 
their generous support during the years of crisis. This would 
have forced banks to cover their externalities. The problem 
is the banks have political power to which cautious social 
democrats like Obama, the Clintons, Brown, and Tony Blair 
have always deferred. These politicians scorned the “bank-
bashing populism” of social democrats like Bernie Sanders, 
Elizabeth Warren, and Jeremy Corbyn. But if Hilary Clinton 
had moved more in that principled, apparently “populist” 
direction, she might have defeated Donald Trump. Had she 
focused on how Obama won Michigan and Ohio by saving 
auto industry jobs (but not the GM CEO Wagoner) she might 
have fared better. In the longer run of the Obama 
administration, while the President’s Chief of Staff Rahm 
Emanuel said “you never want a serious crisis to go to 
waste,”103 the opportunity presented by the crisis was, after 
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all, wasted. The administration eventually succumbed to the 
hegemony of the financialization of capitalism, sustained an 
overly-indebted economy, kept wages down, and missed the 
opportunity for a Green New Deal.104 
In Australia, it took a conservative Prime Minister, 
Malcolm Turnbull, who was struggling against a social 
democratic tide and who himself had been a super-rich 
investment banker, to realize how hated banks were and 
impose the special one-off punitive tax on Australia’s super-
profitable banks in 2017. He also pushed back on the deep 
resistance of his own Liberal Party elite to establish a Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry,105 called 
for by the National Party (a conservative, rural, farmer’s 
party), the Labor Party, and the Greens. A retired High 
Court judge used the extraordinary powers of royal 
commissions in Australia to reveal deeply entrenched 
practices of financial abuse against disadvantaged 
consumers, farmers, and middle-class consumers alike. 
The securities regulator (the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission) responded to criticism of it by the 
Royal Commission by planting a resident member of its 
enforcement staff permanently inside the four big banks and 
AMP, the largest insurance company (all of which were outed 
for exploitative law-breaking during Commission 
hearings).106 As in the United States and United Kingdom, 
 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 19, 2008) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mzcbXi1Tkk. 
 104. See KYLA TIENHAARA, GREEN KEYNESIANISM AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (2018); PHILIP A. WALLACH, TO THE EDGE: LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE 
RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS (2015); Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, 
Opinion, Corporate America Is Suppressing Wages for Many Workers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/opinion/corporate-america-
suppressing-wages.html. 
 105. ROYAL COMMISSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION 
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY, https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov 
.au/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 106. See Gareth Hutchens, Banking Royal Commission: All You Need To 
Know—So Far, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2018, 6:42 PM), 
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Australian citizens have extremely low trust in the integrity 
of financial institutions.107 Citizens have been justified in 
distrusting banks. Wave after wave of popular outrage 
against Australian banks across the past forty years has 
afflicted the banks with one high-profile public enquiry into 
the Australian financial system after another which revealed 
terrible abuses,108 regulatory failure, and recommended 
regulatory reform in response.109 Paradoxically, Australia’s 
endless cycle of scandal110 has served it reasonably well. 
Modest degrees of ethical renewal, regulatory renewal of 
prevention strategies, and enforcement renewal, occurs in 
each wave of inquiry111—even as seemingly pro-business, 
pro-banker appointments are made to conduct each inquiry 
by politicians fearful of the money power of banks. Renewal 
is always very partial and inadequate. Banks move forward 
to support the politicians who were against “bank bashing” 
and cut off those who did not. 
Nevertheless, there is compelling evidence that as more 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/20/banking-royal-
commission-all-you-need-to-know-so-far. 
 107. Emily Cadman, A Decade of Banks Behaving Badly Is Being Laid Bare in 
Australia, BLOOMBERG (29 Apr. 2018, 7:42 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/articles/2018-04-29/decade-of-banks-behaving-badly-laid-bare-in-australi 
an-inquiry. 
 108. The abuses revealed after the collapse of Australia’s then-largest insurer, 
HIH, in 2001 were particularly shocking (its chief executive went to prison). For 
information specific to HIH, see Claudio Damiani et al., The HIH Claims Support 
Scheme, in THE TREASURY ECONOMIC ROUNDUP 37 (Australian Treasury, 2015), 
https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/06/Roundup_Issue-
1_2015_Combined.pdf. 
 109. For a recent, non-exhaustive summary of Australia’s financial services 
inquiries, see Thomas Clarke, A History of Failed Reform: Why Australia Needs 
a Banking Royal Commission, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 11, 2016, 4:10 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/a-history-of-failed-reform-why-australia-needs-a-
banking-royal-commission-64803. 
 110. See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM: CONTROLLING POLICE 
CORRUPTION (1978). 
 111. This is the recipe in Sherman’s book for scandal to lead to reform, as 
opposed to hunkering down until the adverse publicity blows over then return to 
corrupted business as normal. See id. 
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layers have been put in the enforcement pyramids of 
Australian financial regulators, they have accomplished 
genuinely more transparent markets (compared to, for 
example, New Zealand’s, in one analysis).112 This fits with 
the international literature showing that it is not so much 
high levels of regulatory deterrence that prevent corporate 
crime, but use of a strengthened, diverse regulatory mix.113 
There is also evidence that relational regulation of shocking 
financial crimes against consumers has delivered on the one 
hand helpful regulatory reform, and helped the 
 
 112. Ka Wai Choi et al., Responsive Enforcement Strategy and Corporate 
Compliance with Disclosure Regulations (Austl. Nat’l Univ. & Macquarie Univ., 
Working Paper, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2722923. This analysis showed 
that as successive regulatory crises and law reform surges progressively equipped 
ASIC with new layers of more varied arrows in its law enforcement quiver the 
effectiveness of ASIC enforcement progressively increased. The difference-in-
difference analysis with the impact of New Zealand securities and financial 
market regulation reinforced this result. The study investigated the effectiveness 
of securities regulation in making markets more transparent to investors and 
therefore more efficient and hopefully less prone to the burst of artificial bubbles. 
The ASIC outcome of concern was change in financial analysts’ information 
environment and market liquidity. Hence, Choi and his colleagues measured the 
impact of the Australian and New Zealand financial disclosure regimes by 
variables such as reduction in analysts’ forecast errors, forecast dispersion, bid-
ask spread, and increase in the turnover rate from the market liquidity test. The 
ASIC budget and enforcement intensity (measured by prosecution counts) helped 
analysts to reduce forecast errors for future profits, with the responsive 
regulation effect increasing predictive accuracy over and above those impacts on 
the integrity of markets. The leverage in such data was formidable with an 
Australian sample of 148,498 firm-month observations (with each observation 
based on the median for a number of analysts) and a New Zealand sample of 
116,585. Not only does this study have the strength of a multi-construct multi-
method move to a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis of all major 
corporations in an economy on an outcome that securities enforcement is 
designed to deliver, combined with a difference-in-difference analysis of two 
whole economies, it also delivers a larger number of observations than normally 
experienced with empirical socio-legal research. 
 113. See Natalie Schell‐ Busey et al., What Works? A Systematic Review of 
Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 387 (2016); John 
Braithwaite, In Search of Donald Campbell: Mix and Multimethods, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 417 (2016) (discussing Schell-Busey et al., supra). On 
the theory of why this might be so, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART 
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998). 
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disadvantaged victims of those transgressions.114 Critics 
rightly point out that, as in the United States and United 
Kingdom, there have not been enough criminal prosecutions 
of bankers.115 While this is the case, it is important to note 
also the evidence that “enforceable undertakings” negotiated 
through relational regulation are more effective than critics 
who push for consistently punitive measures like 
imprisonment allege.116 So while Australians have good 
reasons for thinking poorly of banks, the frequency of 
Australia’s cycles of scandal and reform have actually made 
its banks rather better than in many other countries. More 
importantly, quite unlike in other countries, the political 
hold of the banks has been significantly lessened not only on 
the social democratic side of politics, but on the conservative 
side; not only on the authoritarian populist right (One 
Nation) and the rural right (the National Party), but also in 
the neoliberal party of business donors (the Liberal Party). 
No Australian bank has been bailed out by taxpayers 
this century, nor in the final years of the last century. The 
Labor government did promise that it would socialize bank 
losses if it had to in 2008, and provided an unlimited 
government guarantee for all bank deposits to discourage 
withdrawals and to restore confidence to depositing and 
lending. It ratcheted up deficit spending more aggressively 
than all the economies that were in deeper trouble in 2008 
 
 114. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); Christine Parker, Restorative Justice in Business 
Regulation? The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s Use of 
Enforceable Undertakings, 67 MOD. L. REV. 209 (2004). 
 115. See Patrick Durkin, ‘Why Me?’ Allan Fels Scolds ANZ Bank after Cartel 
Charges, FIN. REV. (June 4, 2018, 11:00 PM), https://www.afr.com 
/business/banking-and-finance/why-me-allan-fels-scolds-anz-bank-after-cartel-
charges-20180604-h10xmx; Ian Verrender, Crime and Misdemeanours: A Tale of 
Two Law Enforcement Agencies, ABC NEWS (June 3, 2018, 4:21 PM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-04/crime-as-misdemeanours-tale-of-two-
law-enforcement-agencies/9830742. 
 116. MARINA NEHME ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW, MKTS. & REGULATION, UNIV. OF NEW 
SOUTH WALES, THE GENERAL DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF ENFORCEABLE 
UNDERTAKINGS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES AND CREDIT PROVIDERS (2018). 
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and 2009. As a result, the Australian economy grew in every 
quarter of the Global Financial Crisis,117 grew more than any 
OECD country in that period,118 and indeed has grown every 
quarter for a record in the developed world of 28 years.119 
Joseph Stiglitz described the Australian policy response to 
the financial crisis with a little hyperbole as “one of the most 
impressive economic policies I have seen, ever.”120 
Despite these positives, a good argument can be made 
that (as argued by the principal author of the architecture of 
the contemporary Australian financial system, Paul 
Keating)121Australian banking is controlled with excessive 
oligopoly by its big four banks, even for the comparative 
smallness of its economy. Keating believes that competition 
policy has been too permissive in allowing these banks to 
take over their most threatening competitors (such as the St. 
George Building Society and Aussie Home Loans), and that 
contestability from foreign banks has not been robust enough 
in a political game sewn up by the big four.122 Australia’s 
chief of competition regulation during the 1990s, Allan 
Fels,123 has urged that a regulatory separation of deposit 
taking and investment advice to customers is required.124 
 
 117. Edmund Tang, Australia Has Experienced the Longest Period of Economic 
Growth in the Developed World, AUSTL. TRADE & INVESTMENT COMMISSION BLOG 
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.austrade.gov.au/News/Economic-analysis/australia 
-has-experienced-the-longest-economic-growth-among-major-developed-world. 
 118. OECD, OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 252 (2010). 
 119. The last quarter of negative growth in Australia was June 1991. See Tang, 
supra note 117. 
 120. Quoted in WAYNE SWAN, THE GOOD FIGHT: SIX YEARS, TWO PRIME 
MINISTERS AND STARING DOWN THE GREAT RECESSION (2014). 
 121. Australian Treasurer from 1983 to 1991 and Prime Minister from 1991 to 
1996. 
 122. Eric Johnston, Banks Given Too Much Power, Says Keating, THE SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 23, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.smh.com.au/business/ 
banks-given-too-much-power-says-keating-20090922-g0km.html. 
 123. Chair of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission from its 
inception in 1995 until June 30th, 2003. 
 124. Jessica Irvine et al., ‘Stamp Out This Behaviour’—Banks Should Not 
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That is, banks should not be able to put their depositors into 
investment products in which the bank concerned is itself an 
investor. Fels also believes that both of Australia’s financial 
regulators, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
have been too reluctant to launch criminal prosecutions and 
put bankers in jail. This is a fair comment. During Fels’ era 
as Chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, this body took many tough enforcement actions 
to compensate for the consumer protection weaknesses of the 
financial regulators, though mainly through enforceable 
undertakings that included compensation for consumers, 
financial penalties, and mandated compliance reforms 
rather than through criminal prosecutions.125 
When regulators have failed to prevent a financial crisis, 
the regulatory pyramid shown to banks in the aftermath 
could be useful in responding to failures of post-crisis reform. 
One good regulatory change could be the separation of 
deposit-taking from investment advice, or at least from any 
advice to invest in a product in which the bank is implicated. 
This could escalate to total separation of deposit-taking 
banking from all investment banking, as the United States 
put in place with the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act126 during the 
New Deal. More recently, John McCain and Elizabeth 
 
Offer Advice Says Fels, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 18, 2018, 6:16 PM), 
https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/stamp-out-this-
behaviour-banks-should-not-offer-advice-says-fels-20180418-p4zacb.html. 
 125. Regulatory redundancy and inefficiency can have a virtue in checking and 
balancing regulatory capture against the power of big banks. I was able to observe 
this during ten years serving as a part-time Commissioner on Fels’s Commission. 
After Fels’s time at the ACCC helm ended in 2003, a memorandum of 
understanding was developed that defined more clearly which rip-offs of 
consumers would be ACCC and which would be ASIC matters. There was 
efficiency in this. But because of the correct criticism that ASIC has always had 
a less robust enforcement culture than the ACCC, part of the policy debate 
around the Royal Commission was whether the ACCC should be re-weaponized 
to prosecute banks. 
 126. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162. 
See generally Glass-Steagall Act, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/glass_steagall_act.asp. 
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Warren were among those who drafted a bill for a “21st 
Century Glass-Steagall Act,” which sought a separation of 
deposit-taking activities from investment banks, hedge 
funds, insurance, and private equity firms within a five-year 
transition timeframe. The incentives behind the act were 
twofold: to drive de-monopolization in the banking sector and 
to enable banks to be more secure and trusted by depositors. 
In Australia, as everywhere, the selection of the best 
regulatory structure should be responsive to the 
particularities of histories of failure. The optimum number 
of big banks also depends on the size of an economy. At this 
point in Australia’s financial history, a good case can be 
made that it would be better off with five big banks than 
four—it can be significantly harder to effect market collusion 
in oligopolies when just one new oligopolist is added.127 For 
this reason, a good option for Australia could be to insert the 
option of state takeover of one of the smaller competitors to 
the big four into its post-crisis pyramid. The government 
could invest taxpayer funds into this fringe competitor to 
build it into a state-owned big fifth bank. Its charter could 
increase the competitiveness of the banking system by 
undercutting the interest rates, beating the quality of 
service, from the big four, and promising better compliance 
with consumer protection laws. The big fifth bank could later 
be privatized. There would be no need to rush to do this 
before a good sale price could be optimized for taxpayers 
because the evidence does not suggest that economies 
perform worse with higher percentages of banking in state 
hands.128 The fiscal benefit to taxpayers when the shares 
 
 127. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 93, at 139; see also ERIC RASMUSEN, 
GAMES AND INFORMATION (1989); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. 
POL. ECON. 44 (1964). 
 128. See Thomas Marois, State-Owned Banks and Development: Dispelling 
mainstream myths, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE AND THE MENA REGION 52 (M. Mustafa 
Erdogdu & Bryan Christiansen eds., 2016); Svetlana Addrianova et al., Is 
Government Ownership of Banks Really Harmful to Growth? (Brunel Univ. Dep’t 
of Econ. and Fin., Working Paper No. 09-20, May 2009). Countries with a high 
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were sold would likely be huge, given the excess profitability 
of the oligopolistic Australian banks. The long-term legacy of 
the period of reform would be a private big five, instead of 
four, and hopefully an improved regulatory culture129 and a 
diminished Australian national debt. 
This particular reform would be deeply resisted in liberal 
Australia because it is “socialist,” even if only temporarily so. 
That does not mean it is pointless for social democrats and 
Greens130 to signal it as an option if banks continue to behave 
so poorly and continue to lose the trust of the people. It would 
be good politics to do so. Despite the suitability of this idea 
to an Australian context, a policy option like this in a U.S. 
regulatory pyramid could never make sense even as a 
political option, nor perhaps as good policy because of the 
American variegation of financialization.131 The mix needed 
for one country, one sector of capitalism within a country, one 
period of its history, will always be different from another 
 
percentage of public ownership of banking such as Germany are inclined, rightly 
or wrongly, to see this more as a strength than a weakness. See, e.g., Daniel 
Detzer, Financial Systems in Financial Crisis: An Analysis of Banking Systems 
in the EU, 2 INTERECONOMICS 56 (2014). 
 129. See Meidinger, supra note 26. 
 130. The Greens have signaled it as a political option they favor. See Amy 
Remeikis, Which Bank? Richard Di Natale Says Australia Needs a ‘People’s 
Bank’, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com 
/australia-news/2018/apr/04/which-bank-richard-di-natale-says-australia-needs-
a-peoples-bank (covering Richard Di Natale’s National Press Club address in 
April 2018). 
 131. It is nevertheless true that U.S. state governments have often sought to 
sustain competitive pressure from smaller banks in their state by depositing 
state government funds in them. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 93, at 139. 
Ayres and Braithwaite advocate a monopsony standard for this kind of 
governmental partial-industry intervention. The United States would not meet 
this standard with public funding for a competing bank, but Australia quite likely 
would. Private sector firms and defense departments alike act to create a second 
or third source when they are not getting enough competition in their supply 
chain. A monopsony standard provides a limiting principle on when the state 
should not intervene (when private monopsony would not). In economic 
circumstances where a monopsonist private corporation would support the 
creation of a competitor for second-sourcing, states should also consider it. See id. 
ch. 5. 
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country, another sector, another time. Our job in the 
academy is to eschew the political realism that assumes the 
banks will always be too politically powerful to allow 
anything like Figure 1. Our job is to prepare for the next 
crisis, for perhaps a really shocking one during which fascists 
capitalize by attacking “Jewish bankers.” Our job is to ensure 
that the future John McCains and Elizabeth Warrens of a 
more principled financialization of capitalism have some 
ideas in their top drawer for deeper reform. 
Figure 1 displays these options for an Australian post-
crisis pyramid of structural responses to lost confidence in 
banks. 
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FIGURE 1: Options for an Australian post-crisis pyramid of 
structural responses to lost confidence 
 
The bottom five rungs of this pyramid have in effect 
already been put in place in Australia. The next two rungs 
up have been under discussion in the response to the Royal 
Commission, but are unlikely to happen during the current 
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reform cycle. The top two rungs are decidedly intervention 
steps too far for Australian politics today, especially given 
the country’s past (of a Labor government that lost power 
and stayed out of power for 23 years after it sought to 
nationalize all banks).132 The inappropriateness of the design 
of this enforcement pyramid in the United States, United 
Kingdom, or the distinctive context of Poland133 discussed 
above confirms the imperative for variegated responses to 
different catastrophes of different capitalisms. 
VII.  TEMPERING THE PROFIT SHARE 
The last section demonstrated how banks mobilize their 
influence to structurally increase the profit share of finance 
by pushing debt upon people. To do this, they engage in 
consumer fraud, which can become systemic. Bankers think 
this fraud can sustain the demand that keeps capitalism 
pumping. The alternative solution to secure the same 
outcome—reducing debt and increasing wages—is 
unattractive to finance capital. In this section, I explore 
reducing debt and increasing wages as the alternative that 
can make life better for poorer people, while also more 
effectively proofing capitalism against crashes. 
Banks share interests with their most powerful 
corporate clients in that they both seek to suppress global 
regulation of labor standards. Natasha Tusikov’s 
Chokepoints reveals that in China, manufacturers received 
ten dollars in direct payments for wages per iPad, which was 
a wages share of 1.8 percent of the value of an iPad.134 In this 
context, we also know production for Western brands is 
 
 132. This was the Chifley Labor government in 1949. The Mitterrand 
government also had to reverse its disastrous foray into nationalizing France’s 
major banks in 1982, but survived after abandoning the policy. 
 133. Though Poland did have a state bank during the Global Financial Crisis 
that accounted for twenty percent of the banking market. It helped considerably 
with crisis management by pumping up lending in the public interest when the 
private Polish banks were pulling back from lending. 
 134. TUSIKOV, supra note 53, at 9. 
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moving from China because Chinese wages are getting too 
high. Apple could pay its manufacturing workers fifty 
percent more and thereby increase the price of iPads by less 
than one percent. Bearing in mind that better paid workers 
might be better workers, Apple can afford to pay a living 
wage without greatly denting its profits. On the optimistic 
side, this datum reveals that industrial capital does not have 
as strong an interest in oppressive suppression of the wages 
share that finance capital has. 
Economists used to be almost as ambivalent as bankers 
about increasing the wages share of national income. There 
is considerable consensus among economists now, however, 
that the wage share of national incomes has fallen too far to 
reliably sustain long-run job creation, especially when 
inevitable shocks deliver downturns. Sustainable long-term 
demand that keeps unemployment shocks at bay requires 
higher average wages than we see in economies like the 
United States.135 The best way to accomplish this with social 
justice is to increase minimum wages. This would also push 
up the incomes of those earning above the minimum wage, 
as they and their unions demand a correspondingly higher 
salary to accord with their higher skill levels, education, or 
experience. Statistically, declining unionization and 
declining minimum wages in the United States account for 
the majority of its rise in wage inequality during the past 
half century.136 At the same time, a political strategy of 
raising minimum wages is the best way of ensuring that 
most of the benefit of a shift from the profit share to the 
wages share of national income would go to the poorest 
 
 135. See Eckhard Hein & Nina Dodig, Finance-Dominated Capitalism, 
Distribution, Growth and Crisis—Long-Run Tendencies, in THE DEMISE OF 
FINANCE-DOMINATED CAPITALISM: EXPLAINING THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISES 54 (Eckhard Hein, Daniel Detzer & Nina Dodig eds., 2015); BRINK LINDSEY 
& STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH 
THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY (2017). 
 136. SHELLEY MARSHALL, LIVING WAGE: REGULATORY SOLUTIONS TO INFORMAL 
AND PRECARIOUS WORK IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 14 (2019). The discussion in the 
following paragraphs draws heavily on this work by Marshall. 
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workers and to women of the precariat in particular. 
Securing this result is difficult without an 
internationalist struggle for a living wage that complements 
national policy, national campaigns, and local campaigns. 
Shelley Marshall has brilliantly argued how such a 
campaign for a global living wage might be conducted 
pragmatically and incrementally. Her strategy requires the 
trade union movement to reinvent its relevance. She 
suggests that unions shift from focus on national campaigns 
to a global social movement for wage justice. In Errol 
Meidinger’s terms, this requires the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions to show the lead and 
pull the levers to build a more globalized “regulatory 
community”137 for interscalar global and local wage justice. 
A centerpiece of the Marshall strategy would be an 
International Labor Organization (ILO) agreement for 
signatory countries to increase their minimum wage each 
year, with the countries with the lowest minimum wages in 
Purchasing Power Parity terms (adjusted for local living 
costs) agreeing to the highest annual percentage increases. 
Perhaps these might be two percent in real terms.138 Unions 
in wealthy countries would shift some of their resources to 
unions in very poor countries so that those unions could 
support the campaigns of politicians who commit to 
increasing minimum wages. Relatively modest contributions 
from unions in wealthy countries like the United States and 
Germany could buy a great deal of political campaigning and 
worker political mobilization in the world’s poorest 
economies. So might crowd funding in rich countries. For 
unions in rich countries this investment would be an indirect 
strategy for ratcheting up minimum wages in their own 
country. An alternative would be to design the ratchet based 
on the size of the gap between the minimum wage and the 
 
 137. See Meidinger, supra note 26. 
 138. Some sentences here and in the paragraphs that follow are taken from my 
Foreword to Marshall’s (2019) book. MARSHALL, supra note 136, at vii-ix. 
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median wage. 
Marshall’s global strategy is about workers of all 
countries helping one another to ratchet up minimum wages 
and therefore the wages share of income across all countries. 
Each national success would help ratchet up minimum 
wages in all other nations. One way this could happen could 
be as follows. Assume a regime where the countries with the 
lowest ratios between minimum and median wages are 
required to implement the biggest increase in their minimum 
wage; an intermediate group of countries by an intermediate 
percentage; and the countries with the highest ratios of 
minimum to median wages are only required to implement 
the lowest percentage increase. After a number of years 
being required to make the biggest increases to real 
minimum wages, the worst countries would no longer find 
themselves at the bottom of this triage. As some countries 
move up from the middle to the highest group, others will be 
pushed down to the middle group. Then the progress in 
middle group countries will ratchet up minimum wages in 
the countries that start with the highest minimum wages. 
Likewise, improvement in the worst group of counties would 
ratchet up improvement in the middle group as members of 
that group are pushed down into the lowest group. In the 
next year those countries that were formerly in the middle 
group will have to accomplish a bigger increase. So, the lower 
group ratchets up the middle group and the middle group 
ratchets up the higher minimum wage group over time. This 
is the politics of what makes it sensible for unions in the 
highest wage countries to fund campaigns in lowest wage 
countries to sign up to the regime. 
Once the campaign had succeeded in getting a critical 
mass of countries to sign up to the ILO Global Living Wage 
Agreement, campaigning would shift from supporting 
political leaders who lead ratification campaigns to targeting 
hold-outs and saboteurs of the regime who reduce minimum 
wages. Regime saboteurs in Shelley’s model would be 
targeted punitively by consumer and union boycotts, Fair 
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Trade decertification, strikes at multinational companies 
who invest in black-listed low wage countries, and a global 
fund to support strikers campaigning for a Living Wage in 
non-signatory countries. Once many international 
companies had agreed to renounce new investment in black-
listed countries, and once many of the most powerful states 
had signed the agreement, then they would have a strategic 
trade interest in persuading competing firms and companies 
to follow them rather than undercut them.139 
Transnational corporations would be lobbied to sign a 
pledge to do business preferentially with “Living Wage List” 
suppliers and states. The strategy would target the most 
inegalitarian of political parties and firms, but only after a 
long period of regime-building in which none are levied with 
punishment but targeted instead with relational regulation 
and political rewards for joining the regime. Only those 
states and firms that are particularly corrupt and persistent 
in their non-enforcement of minima should be punished. If 
the worst few countries and firms were successfully targeted 
every few years, in the next few years the regime could raise 
the bar by targeting the next worst few firms and the next 
worst few countries. By this point in the evolution of such a 
regime, the majority of producer organizations might even 
join the majority of trade unions in supporting the targeting, 
for the strategic trade reasons outlined above. Raising the 
bar by rewarding many and punishing few is the way to give 
progressive realization of ILO labor rights more strategic 
edge than it currently has. 
Marshall’s strategy integrates innovative sub-national 
approaches to improving labor standards and wages into the 
global ratchets, making it a truly glocal (global and local) 
step-by-step implementation strategy. Her approach 
recursively allows locally responsive strategies to strengthen 
 
 139. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 10, on how strategic trade 
interests have enabled some big structural changes to capitalism in the past, such 
as the abolition of the eighteenth-century international slave trade, and the 1987 
Montreal Protocol. 
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national safety nets, and the national to strengthen the local. 
She argues that there are already incipient examples of her 
proposed strategy in the Asian Floor Wage Alliance, the 
Brazil National Slave Eradication Pact “dirty list” of 300 
companies benefiting from slave labor, and ILO’s Joint 
Maritime Commission statutory determination of 
international minimum wages for seafaring maritime 
workers. 
Marshall’s scholarship shows pathways for weaving 
variegated thin reeds together to craft a resilient fabric of 
transformation. The general direction for the struggle it plots 
is for trade unions to ally with sympathetic civil society 
groups, sympathetic economists and commentators in the 
mass media, social media and crowd sourcing to complement 
national labor regulation with local, regional and industry-
level regimes. Civil society engagement is critical for 
building this regulatory community and achieving normative 
acceptance of the justice of a living wage. It strengthens the 
International Labor Organization to become a meta-
regulator of national regulators by sequencing regulatory 
ratchets in multi-level governance. All levels of ratchets in 
Marshall’s policy design allow each ratchet upwards in 
interscalar governance to be meshed with lower- and higher-
level governance ratchets. These settings make it difficult for 
one ratchet to ratchet down another. Conversely, some 
ratchets up automatically move others up also. This might 
seem quite abstract when framed like this, yet Marshall’s 
book makes the idea practical and concrete. My discussion of 
Marshall’s book has been lengthy because it is a light on the 
hill for a pragmatic regulatory politics of moving from worst-
best to second-best outcomes. Other advocates of global social 
justice strategies, like Oxfam and Citizens for Tax Justice, 
can learn much from Marshall’s ideas about building 
positively a list of ally countries and firms before turning to 
punitive global targeting via a black list of corporations and 
countries. 
Among the strengths of the work, a significant one is the 
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way it combines this reconfigured global strategy for equality 
with fine-grained ethnography of four sub-national 
experiments—from India, Australia, Cambodia and 
Bulgaria. These are experiments in increasing minimum 
wages, health and other conditions for the precariat of these 
countries, the most marginalized of their informal 
workers.140 Marshall diagnoses the successes of these 
experiments, which are limited but real, as dependent on a 
combination of factors, including attunement of design to 
local employment realities and integration of the strategy 
with any strengths in the national labor standards. This 
integration recursively allows for the local to strengthen 
national safety nets and the national to strengthen more 
local safety nets. Marshall also frames the studies as 
different iterations of smart regulation and responsive 
regulation.141 She uses a “medically-inflected” hybrid model 
of regulation in the framing of her research. The Bulgarian 
experiment is a “stent,” widening the arteries that flow to the 
poor. Australia experimented with “pacemaker” innovation 
to stimulate a system of living wage justice. India 
experimented with an institutional “by-pass,” an alternate 
institutional path to living wages. This is a virtuoso re-
imagining of the theory of smart regulation.142 
As with financialization, different capitalisms are 
radically variegated in labor markets according to local 
conditions. In India, Marshall studies the circumstances of 
the country’s huge precariat of head-load (Mathadi) workers 
who wander the ports, railway yards, and markets of cities 
in search of cash-in-hand work, a lot of which involves 
stacking, weighing, and loading as well as head-load 
carrying. This labor market developed in response to local 
conditions, being partly a result of the way British 
 
 140. Local initiatives are shown to be especially important for informal 
workers who are not meshed into global supply chains. 
 141. See GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 113 (on smart regulation); AYRES & 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 93 (on responsive regulation). 
 142. See GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 113. 
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colonialism stripped peasants of land, creating a desperate 
land-poor class who migrated to cities in search of any kind 
of labor. There is no labor market in the United States like 
this. In the United States, the informal sector is a significant 
but marginal variegation of capitalism that especially 
employs the minority of illegal immigrants; in India, most 
employment is informal and not integrated into global 
supply chains that are regulated by labor law.143 
Marshall confined her study to the state of Maharashtra, 
where there are 500,000 Mathadi workers, and over 200,000 
in Mumbai alone. The heavy loads these workers carry 
(usually 100 kg) almost always cause break-down of their 
capacity to work within 15–20 years from back problems. 
Regionally, Mathadi labor is regulated by the Mathadi, 
Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of 
Employment and Welfare) Act of 1969, which introduced a 
system of Mathadi Boards. The act was designed “to secure 
basic protective social security for the unorganised workers 
by ‘regularising’ their intermittently available continuous 
work.”144 The associated Boards target locally specific 
variegations of Mathadi work: one for the docks, one for the 
markets, and so on. The Mathadi Boards not only set labor 
standards; they also act as a labor hire corporation, 
socializing what had been a privatized system of labor hire 
and exploitation. They transform working conditions by 
proactively restructuring the market rather than by 
command and control enforcement of non-compliance with 
labor laws. The law and the Boards cover standard pay and 
conditions as well as pension funds, leave wages, medical 
benefits and compensation for injury, making for a local 
formalization of an informal sector. The Boards also set up 
community kitchens to improve the nutritional 
circumstances that had long afflicted these impoverished 
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workers who are often remote from their homes. They built 
two hospitals that specialize in medical services for the 
problems of Mathadi, such as their back injuries. Boards also 
assist with the education of workers. 
Marshall considers the Mathadi Board system of 
regional regulation as a partial but formidable success, one 
which lays a foundation for social mobility that sees many 
“sons and daughters of mathadi workers [become] medical 
doctors, lawyers, IT professionals and the like.”145 Other 
Indian states have emulated this Maharashtra innovation in 
de-casualizing and empowering labor. Marshall reports that 
the Maharashtra case has commonalities with other cases of 
regional Indian regulation such as the Welfare Boards of 
Kerala, and other geographically local labor regulation 
modalities in other countries. Some of the compassionate and 
relational regulation of the Kerala and Maharashtra Boards 
have been picked up nationally in the Indian Unorganised 
Workers’ Social Security Act (2008).146 
Marshall’s research shows the clear need for regulation 
that is variegated to the changing conditions at regional, 
national, and sectoral levels, as well as the nodal levels of 
particular ports, markets, and railway yards. Part of the 
beauty of the case is in the compassionate character of the 
regulatory law this enables. 
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL META-REGULATION: AN 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY BRANCH 
This section shifts focus to the role of Constitutional law 
in tempering power and enabling and holding accountable 
reforms of the kinds discussed in earlier sections. 
One of the deepest structural dilemmas in the struggle 
for alleviation of the suffering caused by banks is that banks 
have interests in keeping debts high and wages low. So do 
 
 145. MARSHALL, supra note 136, at 70. 
 146. Id. at 71; see also id. ch. 4. 
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brands that exploit impoverished workers. They also have an 
interest in persuading regulators and their political masters 
that what’s good for JP Morgan and Apple is good for 
America. One approach to remedy can be found in ancient 
Confucian thought about state capture and corruption. One 
ancient Chinese remedy was the institution of an 
independent examinations branch of governance. To be 
appointed as a civil servant, prosecutor, or judge, in an era 
that pre-dated universities, one had to pass an exacting 
examination tailored to the professional demands of the 
examinations branch. The branch served as an ancient 
Chinese method of constitutionally regulating poor 
governance and for ensuring competence in state 
administration. The idea of independent branches that could 
regulate the executive government was also evident in the 
office of the Censor (御史; yù shǐ) under the Qin and Han 
dynasties, which influenced the modern constitutional 
thought of Sun Yat Sen.147 Later, the Sui and Tang dynasties 
established the office of the tái (臺), which supervised the 
conduct of civil servants and military officers.148 
In Sun Yat Sen’s Republic of China constitution that was 
voted for in 1928, but not implemented until 1947, this 
tradition was picked up in an innovative adaptation of 
western republican thought to regulate the anarchic conflicts 
for power in the early republic.149 That constitution provided 
for five semi-autonomous branches of government: a 
legislature, an executive, a judiciary, an examinations 
branch, and an accountability and integrity branch called the 
Control Yuan. The Control Yuan was elected until a 1992 
revision to the Constitution and Clause 90 of the 1947 
Constitution defined it as “the highest supervisory organ of 
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the state.” Fundamental to thinking about the Control Yuan 
was that it would check capture and abuse of power not only 
by regulatory agencies in the executive branch, but also by 
the legislature and judiciary. Instead of allowing these 
branches to impeach their own wayward members, the 
accountability and integrity branch would independently 
adjudge impeachment. The Constitutional realities of the 
1947 Constitution have meant that censure and “corrective 
measures” are speedier and more potent than 
impeachment.150 In the thirty years since the demise of 
martial law in Taiwan, there have been only 541 
impeachment cases.151 Sun Yat Sen’s original thinking on 
the separation of powers had a sixth branch, the Auditing 
Yuan. However, in 1931 the Auditing Yuan was subsumed 
as the Ministry of Audit into the Control Yuan. 
Contemporary re-invigorations of this Chinese republican 
thought could be considered for the next constitutional 
revolution that occurs in a Western democracy. This is 
particularly so for a contemporary west where 
financialization has captured politics and the regulation of 
capital in a way that is dangerous to the sustainability of 
freedom. The job of an independent regulation and 
accountability branch is the regulation of the state, meta-
governance (the governance of governance),152 or meta-
regulation.153 
Sun Yat Sen’s five branches of governance persist in the 
Taiwan (Republic of China) constitution today.154 During 
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Chiang Kai-shek’s long rule of militarized authoritarianism, 
Sun Yat Sen ideals were gutted and the Control Yuan 
became a puppet of executive rule even as Taiwan turned 
back to democracy. While calls to weaken or abolish the 
Control Yuan are incessant, in recent democratic renewal of 
Taiwan, the Control Yuan does some useful meta-regulatory 
work, such as implementing the Sunshine Acts to ensure 
transparency, regulating political donations, and 
maintaining registers of assets held by public officials.155 In 
addition to supervising what would be called the Auditor-
General function in the west, the Taiwan Control Yuan 
supervises the integrity and independence of the other four 
branches by way of the Control Yuan Committee on Anti-
Corruption. Other Committees exist for other purposes. 
There is a Control Yuan Committee on Human Rights with 
functions similar to western human rights commissions. 
There is a Standing Committee on Judicial Affairs and 
Prison Administration, performing the functions judicial 
self-regulation performs in the west as well as prison 
ombudsman and prison inspectorate functions. The Control 
Yuan also has an oversight Standing Committee for National 
Defence and Intelligence Affairs, as well as a committee with 
oversight of procurement by all branches of governance. A 
separate standing committee looks after ethnic minority 
affairs. Although the Control Yuan, as in white-settler 
societies, has a class interest in upholding Han Chinese 
interests over those of the original indigenous minority 
owners of the land, it does seem a visionary idea to have a 
sub-branch of governance with the job of holding the other 
branches to account on questions of indigenous rights and 
indigenous reconciliation. More so one that has a high 
proportion of indigenous staff members and that is 
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independent of the (majoritarian) judiciary. 
Thailand is the only country to have emulated the 
Taiwan constitutional architecture of an accountability and 
integrity branch. The 1997 “People’s Constitution” was a 
radical document in terms of public participation and rights 
accountability. It was dismantled by the 2006 military coup 
and the 2007 Constitution promulgated by the Council for 
National Security, which made it a crime to criticize the draft 
constitution.156 It is perhaps testimony to the virtues of this 
architecture that tyrants found it so dangerous. Members of 
the fourth inspection branch of the 1997 Thai Constitution 
oversaw impeachment in the other three branches, the 
election commission, the human rights commission, 
ombudsman, audit and anti-corruption functions, as in the 
Taiwan Control Yuan. The 1997 Thai Constitution involved 
the further innovation that membership of this fourth 
branch was only elected from candidates who were not 
members of political parties and for one term only. This 
served as a prudent check against progressive capture by 
parties and business cronies that dominate the executive and 
legislature and stack the judiciary. 
There is something attractive about tempering power 
through Sun Yat Sen’s architecture of a fourth accountability 
branch of governance comprised of many branches within it. 
This is so even though his law that was written for all of 
China was pushed aside by the Communist Party and only 
embraced (and corrupted) by the military dictatorship in 
Taiwan for window dressing, and then cast aside again after 
the only genuine attempt at emulation when a military coup 
afflicted Thailand in 2006. For societies where settlers have 
forced indigenous landowners off their country, there is 
appeal in one of Taiwan’s branches being elected from 
indigenous peoples for oversight of the other branches in 
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terms of the longue durée of reconciliation. This in the 
context of histories of indigenous dispossession and mass 
atrocity, disproportionate contemporary imprisonment, and 
abuse of indigenous rights more broadly. Constitutionally 
empowering this kind of compassionate entrenchment of 
indigenous regulatory authority is appealing and novel.157 
For societies ruled by banker power, the idea of independent 
meta-regulation of banking regulators, central banks, and 
labor regulators to ensure they are not captured or corrupted 
by capital or by politicians on the prowl for campaign 
contributions is an attractive one to have ready in the top 
drawer after the next crisis. Promising experiments in 
republican governance for the future from our study of the 
past might include those that never fully blossomed, 
especially so with institutions for checking domination killed 
off by the tyrannies of militaries, monarchs, and party 
machines. 
IX. CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES 
Totalizing tropes like neoliberalism can inhibit the 
analytic imagination from grasping the variegation of 
capitalism. Likewise, it can inhibit the regulatory 
imagination from crafting regulation that can be responsive 
to plural capitalism. I have argued that actioning this is not 
a craft of destroying the power of capital, but of tempering it 
so it becomes stronger in the form of a hybrid governance 
consisting of many branches of power.158 It is a craft of 
building and progressively strengthening a strong 
constitution, strong government, strong markets, strong civil 
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society, strong individuals, each enabling and checking the 
other. The article has sought to illustrate the relevance of a 
tempering power framework to the most commanding 
institutions of contemporary capitalism: financial markets, 
information markets, labor markets, constitutions, and the 
regulation of war and peace (illustrated with Timor-Leste). 
Contemporary liberal democracies are at risk of a 
dangerous short-termism fuelled by financialization. This is 
a capitalism that allows puppeteers of bank power to 
succumb to an ethic of ruthlessness. In the extreme case, 
bankers accumulate short-term bonuses that they disinvest 
from their own banks when the time is right, short the 
disastrous future prospects of bank stocks after they get out, 
allow taxpayers to bail banks out, and then start another 
merry-go-round of untempered power.159 Financialization 
creates an unjust society that refuses a fair share of the 
nation’s wealth to those who earn their living from wages. 
This society burdens our children and grandchildren with 
debt, national and personal, more debt than is prudent. 
Institutional catastrophe may then open a door to crisis and 
authoritarianism. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008, in a 
smaller way than German hyperinflation after the global 
crash from 1929, has delivered impetus to authoritarian 
politics of varying but considerable degrees across Western 
states today. In the long term we must learn to conquer this 
problem or it will conquer us. Authoritarian capitalism 
might or might not continue to displace liberal capitalism to 
take over the world. 
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Regulation, it is hypothesized, has more potential to be 
just and effective in response to the challenges of 
financialization when it: 
is motivated by an explicit philosophy of tempering 
power, an accountability that renders power less 
arbitrary, more compassionate and relational; 
is variegated to be responsive to the variegation of 
capitalism across space, time, sectors, firms, and 
nodes of governance; 
is constitutionally meta-regulated for accountability and 
integrity of tempered power; 
can escalate from relational justice to deterrent legal 
formalism;160 
is on guard against the risk that authoritarian 
capitalism could prove more sustainable than liberal 
capitalism for the challenge of steering demand 
without unmanageable debt and while paying 
adequate wages; 
is on guard against the way liberal capitalism nurtures 
internal variegations of authoritarian capitalism 
inside the service sectors of their own “liberal” 
societies, as in the exploitation of illegal immigrants 
or guest workers; 
understands the danger of corporate power becoming 
liberalism’s fifth column when firms proactively 
prefer to locate production in authoritarian societies 
that crush rights, underpay workers, and endanger 
the environment. Untempered corporate power is 
encouraged by ruthless investors to invent new 
technologies of surveillance and military domination 
for the defense of authoritarianism. Liberal 
capitalism therefore paradoxically strengthens 
authoritarian capitalism in its competition with 
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liberal capitalism. 
There is of course an even bigger challenge in the face of 
which liberal capitalism may prove unsustainable. This is 
how to prevent ecological collapse. Regulation must shift the 
shape of the economy so that the demand that averts 
economic crisis and authoritarianism is not demand for 
material goods, but for more human services such as health, 
aged care, education, and demand for regulatory steering of 
capitalism itself.161 There are no guarantees that liberal 
capitalism will prove more capable than authoritarian 
capitalism at navigating the challenges of regulating finance 
and guaranteeing a fair labor share of national income. 
Likewise there is no guarantee that it will be more effective 
at averting ecological collapse. That larger challenge for 
republican governance is one I will wrestle with in future 
work. This journey will likewise be lit by forty years of 
illuminating Baldy scholarship on environmental 
governance. 
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